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I. INTRODUCTION

The last decade has proven to be a landmark era in the area of corporate
mergers and acquisitions.' Perhaps the most rapid development in this area
has been in the growth of antitakeover devices to defend against unwanted,
hostile takeover attempts. The most noteworthy of the devices developed has
been the share purchase rights plan.2 Since its inception in 1983, the use of

1. See, e.g., CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp.
422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261 (Del. 1989); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. (In re
Newmont Mining Corp. Shareholders Litigation), 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987);
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del.
1984); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990);
TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL
20290 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp. (In
re Polaroid Shareholders Litigation), 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989); Grand
Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co. Shareholders
Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556
A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In
re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litigation), 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988).
2. A share purchase rights plan is an antitakeover device that, depending
on its structure, generally allows shareholders other than a hostile bidder to
acquire shares at a price below market. A share purchase rights plan or
"poison pill" is triggered when-a hostile bidder acquires a specified percentage
of a company's stock. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1348-49; Sutton Holding
Corp. v. DeSoto, Inc., Nos. 11221, 11222, 1990 WL 13476, at *5 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 5, 1990); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans (In re Macmillan, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation), 552 A.2d 1227, 1230-31 (Del. Ch.), appeal
dismissed, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND
FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQUISmONs 636-39 (1986); Robert Comment &

Gregg A. Jarrell, Two-Tier and Negotiated Tender Offers: The Imprisonment
of the Free-Riding Shareholder, 19 J. FIN. ECON. 283, 284 n.1 (1987);
Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, CorporateMergers:Redefining the Role
of Target Directors,136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 408 n.360 (1987); Martin Lipton
& Andrew R. Brownstein, Takeover Responses and Directors' Responsibili-
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the share purchase rights plan, or "poison pill" as it is more commonly known,
as a defensive mechanism against hostile tender offers has generated much
controversy and debate in the legal and business communities.'

ties-An Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1422-25 (1985); Georgeson & Co.,
Poison Pill Impact Study (Mar. 31, 1988) (concluding that companies with
poison pills received substantially higher takeover premiums than companies
without poison pills); Georgeson & Co., PoisonPillImpact Study II (Oct. 31,
1988) (concluding that, on the average, the stocks of companies with poison
pills outperformed companies without poison pills); Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
Impact of Adoption of Stockholder Rights Plans on Stock Prices (1986)
(concluding that the implementation of poison pills generallyincreased the
price of the stock of a company); A Study on the Economics of Poison Pills,
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 183,971 (Mar. 5, 1986)
(conducted by SEC economists and concluding that the adoption of poison
pills by companies subject to takeover speculation decreased stock prices); see
generally A. GILCHRIST SPARKS, III ET AL., DelawareLaw Considerationsin
UndertakingAcquisitions, in ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS 1989, at 9, 19-31
(PLI 1989).
3. See GILSON, supra note 2, at 738-39; Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M.
Hoff, The Duties ofBoards To Redeem PoisonPills,N.Y. L.J., Dec. 15, 1988,
at 5; Comment & Jarrell, supra note 2, at 284 n.1; Johnson & Siegel, supra
note 2, at 408 n.360; Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 30-31 (1987); William Meyers,
Showdown in Delaware: The Battle to Shape Takeover Law, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Feb. 1989, at 64; Michael W. Schwartz, Chancery Court Ignores
Del. Supreme CourtPrecedents,N.Y. L.J., June 5, 1989, at 45; Georgeson &
Co., Poison Pill Impact Study (Mar. 31, 1988) (concluding that companies
with poison pills received substantially higher takeover premiums than
companies without poison pills); Georgeson & Co., Poison PillImpact Study
11 (Oct. 31, 1988) (concluding that, on the average, the stocks of companies
with poison pills outperformed companies without poison pills); Kidder,
Peabody & Co., Impact of Adoption of Stockholder Rights Plans on Stock
Prices (1986) (concluding that the implementation of poison pills generally
increased the price of the stock of a company); A Study on the Economics of
PoisonPills,supra note 2 (conducted by SEC economists and concluding that
the adoption of poison pills by companies subject to takeover speculation
decreased stock prices); see generally SPARKS Er AL., supra note 2, at 19-31.
In June of 1983, Lenox, Inc. introduced what many regard to be the
original poison pill plan in response to a takeover attempt by Brown-Forman
Distillers Corporation. Lenox, Inc. responded to a takeover attempt by
Brown-Forman Distillers Corporation by issuing convertible preferred stock
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4

1992]

Kalajian: Kalajian: Controversial World of Corporate Mergers
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

In recent years, the Delaware courts, and in particular the Delaware Court
of Chancery, have been very active in expressing their opinions with respect
to many of the practices currently being used in the area of corporate mergers
and acquisitions. The Delaware Court of Chancery has been particularly active
in addressing the use of poison pills.4 The court has expressed its opinion in
as a dividend to its shareholders. The preferred stock was designed so that
upon a follow-up business combination, the preferred stock was convertible
into shares of the acquiror's voting common stock. In an effort to inhibit
takeover attempts, the preferred stock was structured so that if it was fully
converted upon a business combination, the holders of existing control blocks
of the acquiror would suffer considerable dilution. Further, the conversion
price guaranteed that the target's shareholders would receive a price not less
than that paid in the first stage of the tender offer. See Robert C. Micheletto,
Comment, The Poison Pill: A Panacea For The Hostile CorporateRaider,
21 J. Marshall L. Rev. 107, 112 n.32 (1987); see also David A. Rosenzweig,
Note, PoisonPill Rights: Toward a Two-Step Analysis of Directors' Fidelity
to Their Fiduciary Duties, 56 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 373, 373 n.2 (1988); A
Study on the Economics of PoisonPills, supra note 2, at 88,044.
Martin Lipton has supported the use of defensive takeover measures in
the current environment. See Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979). More recently he has stated that,
"[w]ith limitations on abusive takeovers in place, there no longer will be a
justification for structural defenses that treat common shareholders unequally
or are triggered by a change of control, such as poison pills, lock-up options,
and fair price provisions." Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
FinanceCorporatism,supra, at 60 n.280, 65. See also Lipton & Brownstein,
supra note 2, at 1422-25. See generally Compounding the Headache,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Jan./Feb. 1990, at 21; Alan Schwartz, Search

Theory and the Tender OfferAuction, 2 J.L., ECON., & ORG. 229, 245 (1986).
With respect to poison pills and companies that are for sale, Professors
Johnson and Siegel have stated:
The proposal, therefore, specifically requires directors of targets that
are for sale to give all bidders a fair opportunity to compete. The
proposal accomplishes this by (1) prohibiting the use of defensive
tactics or the implementation of state statutes designed to deter a
competing bid, and (2) requiring target directors to waive uniformly
any pre existing repellant measures such as poison pills or state
legislative protections that remain under their control.
Johnson & Siegel, supra note 2, at 408.
4. See Paramount,[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514; TW Servs., 1989 WL 20290; Pillsbury, 558 A.2d 1049; Interco, 551
A.2d 787.
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this area of the law predominantly through a series of decisions starting with
City CapitalAssociates Ltd. Partnershipv. Interco Inc.5
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the poison pill and use it as a
vehicle to examine other important topics in the area of corporate mergers and
acquisitions, all as reviewed by the Delaware Court of Chancery and, where
pertinent, by the Delaware Supreme Court. In addition to the poison pill, this
Article examines such topics in the area of corporate mergers and acquisitions
as the tender offer process, antitakeover devices, valuation, and economics, as
well as other significant topics. These topics are analyzed by examining the
Interco decision, which is most illustrative of issues in this area, and by
comparing it to the applicable line of decisions that have followed in the
Delaware Court of Chancery, as well as certain holdings of the Delaware
Supreme Court.
In Part II of this Article, I discuss the facts and holding in the Interco
case. A detailed discussion of the facts and holding in this case helps to
clearly present the issues that are analyzed in this Article.
In Part III, I review the Interco decision, as well as relevant decisions
of the Delaware Supreme Court. I undertake my analysis in this section from
a purely legal perspective.
In Part IV, I discuss the series of pertinent decisions of the Delaware
Court of Chancery that followed Interco. My analysis in this section is still of
a purely legal nature.
In Part V, I analyze the Paramountdecision of the Delaware Supreme
Court, again from a legal perspective. The impact of the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision will be considered both in general terms, and as it applies to
the decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery.
In Part VI, I take two decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery
discussed in previous sections of this Article from a legal perspective, but this
time analyze them from an economic perspective. I consider whether it is
possible to make the argument that the holdings are justified when viewed
solely from an economic perspective.
Part VII consists of a summary and a conclusion. Throughout this Article,
I comment on the merits and shortcomings of the various positions taken and
arguments stated. I also make recommendations on the issues discussed.

5. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988), appealdismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del.
1988).
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II. THE FAcTS IN INTERCO

Interco Incorporated is a diversified Delaware holding company with its
principal offices located in St. Louis, Missouri. In late 1985, Interco adopted
a poison pill with a "flip-in" provision.' Management claimed that it adopted
this poison pill because it viewed the company as susceptible to a highly
leveraged "bust-up" takeover.8 Management attributed Interco's susceptibility
to such a takeover to a lack of integration in the company's corporate
structure. 9
In response to trading activity that began in May 1988, and that was
caused by the acquisition of Interco stock by Steven and Mitchell Rales
through City Capital Associates Limited Partnership ("City Capital"), the
Interco board met on July 11, 1988,o at which time they redeemed the rights
issued as part of a 1985 rights plan and issued a new rights plan that
contained both "flip-in" and "flip-over" rights.1

6. Id. at 791. Interco has 21 subsidiary companies in four major business
areas: furniture and home furnishings, footwear, apparel and general
merchandizing. Interco owns such nationally recognized brands as London
Fog raincoats; Ethan Allen, Lane, and Broyhill furniture; Converse All-Star
athletic shoes; and Le Tigre and Christian Dior sportswear. Id.
7, Id. A poison pill with a flip-in provision allows the current shareholders of a company, other than the hostile bidder, to acquire additional shares
in the company at a price below market. See JoY M. BRYAN, CORPORATE
ANI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES: THE POISON PILL DEVICE at xx (Charles E.
Simon & Co. 1990); Harold S. Bloomenthal, Introduction: Tender Offer
Defenses-The PoisonPill;State Takeover Statutes in BRYAN, supra, at Intro.1 to -3; Ronald A. Brown, Jr., Note, An Examinationof a Board of Directors'
Duty to Redeem the Rights Issued Pursuantto a Stockholder Rights Plan, 14
DEL. J. CORP. L. 537, 542 n.29 (1989); Micheletto, supra note 3, at 116-18.
8. Interco, 551 A.2d at 791. A "bust-up" takeover occurs when a
company is acquired and its various divisions/business units/pieces are
separately sold off. See Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 2, at 1411-12; see
generally Reinier Kraakman, Taking DiscountsSeriously: The Implications of
"Discounted"Share Pricesas an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 891,

901, 908 (1988).
9. Interco, 551 A.2d at 791. Interco is structured so its subsidiaries
function as autonomous units and are not viewed by management as part of
a large integrated unit. Id.
10. Id. at 791.
11. Id. A poison pill with a "flip-over" provision allows the current
shareholders of a company, other than a hostile bidder, to acquire additional
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The flip-in provision of the new rights plan provided that if an entity
acquired 30% of Interco's common stock, each rights holder could exercise
his right to purchase that number of Interco shares per right which, at that
time, would have a market value of twice the exercise price of each right."
The "flip-over" provision provided that in the event of a merger of Interco or
upon the acquisition of 50% or more of Interco's assets or earning power, "the
rights may be exercised to acquire common stock of the
acquiring company
13
right."
the
of
price
exercise
the
twice
of
value
a
having
On July 15, 1988, the Chairman of Interco's board, Mr. Harvey Saligman,
issued a press release announcing his intention
to recommend a major
14
restructuring of the company to Interco's board.
On July 27, City Capital made an offer to Interco to acquire the company
by merger for a price of $64 per share in cash, contingent upon the availability of financing.1 5 On August 8, City Capital increased its offering 1price
to
6
$70 per share, still conditioned upon securing the required financing.
On August 8, at Interco's regularly scheduled board meeting, Wasserstein
Perella & Co., Inc. ("Wasserstein Perella"), Interco's investment banker,
informed Interco's board that it viewed City Capital's $70 offer as inadequate. 7 Wasserstein Perella also analyzed the possibility of selling certain

shares in a hostile bidder for a price below market. BRYAN, supra note 7, at
xx; Bloomenthal, supra note 7, at Intro.-1 to -3. See also STANLEY F. REED
& LANE AND EDSON, P.C., THE ART OF M&A: A MERGER ACQUISITION
BUYOUT GUIDE 772-73 (1989); Jesse A. Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection
Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers: The Validity of Fair Price,
MandatoryBid, andFlip-OverProvisionsUnderDelawareLaw, 11 SEC. REG.
L.J. 291, 299-310 (1984); Edward F. Greene & James J. Junewicz, A
Reappraisalof CurrentRegulations of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA.
L. REv. 647, 705 (1984); Johnson & Siegel, supranote 2, at 333 n.65; Brown,
supra note 7, at 541-43, 541 n.24; Micheletto, supra note 3, at 114-16; A
Study on the Economics of Poison Pills, supra note 2, at 88,044-45.
12. Interco, 551 A.2d at 791.
13. Id. at 791-92.
14. Id. at 792.
15. Id. On July 27, 1988, the Rales brothers disclosed through the filing
of a Schedule 13D with the Securities and Exchange Commission that, as of
July 11, they owned 3,140,300 shares, or 8.7% of Interco's common stock.
Id.
16. Id.The $70 per share offer was made prior to any response by the
Interco board to City Capital's previous $64 per share offer. Id.
17. Id. Discounted cash flow analysis, and an analysis of premiums paid
over existing stock prices for specific tender offers during early 1988, as well

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss3/1
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Interco businesses while retaining others.'
Through this analysis
Wasserstein Perella arrived at a value "reference range" of $68 to $80 per
share for Interco." At this same meeting, "the board voted to decrease the
threshold percentage needed to trigger the flip-in provision of the rights plan
from 30% to 15% and elected to explore a restructuring plan for the
'
[c]ompany. W
The Rales brothers, on August 15, announced a public tender offer at $70
cash per share for all of the outstanding stock of Interco. The court explained,
"The offer was conditioned upon (1) receipt of financing, (2) the tender of
sufficient shares to give the offeror a total holding of at least 75% of the
[c]ompany's common stock on a fully diluted basis at the close of the offer,
(3) the redemption of the rights plan, and (4) a determination as to the
inapplicability of 8 Del. C. § 203.21
On August 22, the board held a special meeting to consider the Rales
brothers' $70 per share tender offer.2 The Interco board decided to
recommend against the tender offer.23 The board based its recommendation,
in part, on a revised value "reference range" of $74 to $87 for Interco in its
entirety.2 4 The board also decided at this meeting to keep the rights plan in
place and not to render Delaware Code Annotated title 8, section 203 2
inapplicable to the tender offer.26 Further, the board decided not to disclose

as other forms of analysis were used by Wasserstein Perella to arrive at their
opinion. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. City Capital was unsuccessful in its legal proceedings against
Interco. It attempted to secure a determination from a federal district court
that Delaware Code Annotated title 8, § 203 was invalid on constitutional
grounds. See City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 696 F.
Supp. 1551 (D. Del.), aff'd, 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988).
22. Interco, 551 A.2d at 792.

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. The statute states in part, "Notwithstanding any other provisions of
this chapter, a corporation shall not engage in any business combination with
any interested stockholder for a period of 3 years following the date that such
stockholder became an interested stockholder." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203
(1991). The Interco court cites the version of § 203 in place in 1988. The
statute has not been amended since then.
26. Interco, 551 A.2d at 792.
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confidential information27 related to the tender offer unless City Capital
agreed to enter into a confidentiality agreement' and a standstill agreement29 with Interco.
At this meeting, the board went on to examine alternatives to the City
Capital offer.3 ' This included a resolution by the board empowering
management ". . to explore all appropriate alternatives to the [City Capital]
offer, including, without limitation, the recapitalization, restructuring or other
reorganization of the company, the sale of assets of the company in addition
to the Apparel Manufacturing Group, and other extraordinary transactions, to
maximize the value of the company to the stockholders.... 32
On August 23, Interco informed City Capital by letter3 3 that it had
decided to explore alternatives to the City Capital offer.34 Interco also

27. City Capital had requested confidential information from Interco. Id.
28. Id. A confidentiality agreement states that a company (usually the
target) agrees to release confidential information about itself to a second
company (usually a tender offeror) and the second company agrees not to
disclose that information to any other entity.
29. Id. "A standstill agreement pledges a bidder to cease acquiring
further shares of the target, typically for a defined period unless further
acquisitions are approved by the target's management. In return, the bidder
is typically given access to confidential information from the target." John C.
Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in CorporateGovernance, 84 COLUM.
L. REV. 1145, 1261 (1984).
30. Under the proposed standstill agreement, City Capital could not make
any tender offer for Interco for a period of three years unless a tender offer
was approved by Interco. There did not appear to be a provision in the
agreement that would allow City Capital to make an offer for all of Interco's
shares at a price higher than an offer supported by the Interco board. Interco,
551 A.2d at 792 n.5.
31. Id. at 793. Wasserstein Perella performed a valuation of each of
Interco's operating components and presented its findings to the Interco board.
Id.
32. Id. (quoting Minutes of Meeting, August 22, 1988) (ellipses in
original).
33. Id. This exchange of letters was the only communication between
Interco and City Capital during the period between August 22, when the $70
offer was made, and September 10, when a higher offer of $72 per share was
made by City Capital. Id. Both sides claimed unsuccessful attempts to
contact the other by telephone during this period. Id.
34. Id. Interco did inform City Capital that it intended to disclose
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informed City Capital that it would not release information to City Capital
unless City Capital entered into a confidentiality agreement and a standstill
agreement. 35 On August 26, City Capital responded to Interco's proposal by
suggesting that the two parties enter into a confidentiality agreement without
a standstill provision. 6
On September 10, the Rales brothers increased their offer for Interco to
$72 per share. 7 On September 19, the Interco board considered the $72
offer and rejected it on grounds of financial inadequacy.3 Instead, the board
agreed to adopt a restructuring proposal as presented by Wasserstein
Perella.39 The court in Interco described the proposed restructuring as
follows:
Under the terms of the restructuring designed by Wasserstein Perella,
Interco would sell assets that generated approximately one-half of its gross
sales and would borrow $2.025 billion. It would make very substantial
distributions to shareholders, by means of a dividend, amounting to a stated
aggregate value of $66 per share. The $66 amount would consist of (1) a
$25 dividend payable November 7 to shareholders of record on October 13,
consisting of $14 in cash and $11 in face amount of senior subordinated
debentures, and (2) a second dividend (declared on October 19 and payable
no earlier than November 29) of (a) $24.15 in cash, (b) $6.80 principal
amount of subordinated discount debentures, (c) $5.44 principal amount of
junior subordinated debentures, (d) convertible preferred stock with a
liquidation value of $4.76, and (e) a remaining equity interest or stub that
Wasserstein Perella estimated (based on projected earnings of the then
remaining business) would trade at a price of at least $10 per share. Thus,
the total value of the restructuring to shareholders would, in the opinion of
Wasserstein Perella, be at least $76 per share on a fully distributed basis. °

confidential information to other entities in the course of exploring alternative
options. Id.
35. Id. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
36. Interco, 551 A.2d at 793.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Wasserstein Perella's compensation arrangement with Interco
awarded the firm substantial contingency pay upon the completion of a
restructuring. Id. With respect to this compensation arrangement, the court
viewed Wasserstein Perella as having a conflict of interest in opining that the
value of the restructuring was greater than City Capital's all cash offer. Id.
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The market, as well as City Capital's investment banker, Drexel Lambert
Burnham Incorporated valued Interco at $70 per share.41
On September 15, Interco started its restructuring by announcing its plans
to sell the Ethan Allen furniture division, citing that Ethan Allen could not be
integrated into its other furniture divisions and was not suitable for the cost
42 City Capital viewed Ethan Allen as
cutting required by the restructuring.
43
Interco's "crown jewel.1
On September 20, Interco announced the initial terms of its restructuring."4 These terms were revised on September 27 in that "the dividend
declared on October 13, 1988 would accrue interest at 12% per annum from
that date to the payment date; and second, that the second phase dividend
would similarly accrue interest (currently expected to be at a rate of 13 3/4%
per annum) from the date of its declaration." 45
On October 18, City Capital raised its offer for Interco to $74 per
share.46 This proposal, like the preceding bid, was an all cash offer for all
the shares of Interco.47

On October 19, the Interco board rejected City Capital's $74 offer.'
The board based its decision to reject the offer on its position that the price
of $74 was inadequate and that the proposed restructuring would yield a value
of at least $76 per share.49

41. Id. at 793-94. Interco believes that the risks involved with this
litigation, as well as other associated factors, account for the market's $70 per
share valuation. Id. at 794 n.6.
42. Id. at 794.
43. Id. A "crown jewel" is usually considered to be the most desirable
part/division of a company. See Coffee, supra note 29, at 1261; Green &
Junewicz, supra note 11, at 701; Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers as
NegotiatingAgents for Target Shareholdersin Tender Offers: A Reply to the
Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53, 92, 92 n.131 (1985).
44. Interco, 551 A.2d at 794.
45. Id.
46. Id. This, like the previous offers, was "an all cash offer for all shares
with a contemplated back-end merger for the same consideration." Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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III. THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY EXPRESSES ITS
POSITION ON TOPICS IN THE AREA OF CORPORATE
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

A. The Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco Has
Misinterpretedand Misapplied the "BusinessJudgmentRule"
and the "Unocal Test" to the Poison Pill
Under Delaware Code Annotated title 8, section 141(a), the board of
directors has the responsibility and power to manage the "business and affairs"
of a corporation."
The "business judgment rule" articulates limited
guidelines which must be followed by directors 1 The rule is a "presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the2 honest belief that the action taken
was in the best interests of the company."0

50. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) states:
The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or
in its certificate of incorporation. If any such provision is made in
the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or
imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be
exercised or performed to such extent and by such person or persons
as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation.
The 1991 version of § 141 is identical to the version in place at the time of
the Interco case.
51. In Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984), the Delaware
Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule, including the standards
for the judgment of director conduct, applied to takeover situations. See also
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
52. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See also Ivanhoe
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. (In re Newmont Mining Corp. Shareholders Litigation), 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Moran v. Household Int'l,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; Robert M.
Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans (In re Macmillan, Inc. Shareholders Litigation), 552
A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988);
West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co.
Shareholders Litigation), 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988); Frederick W. Kanner,
Management-Led LBOs: DirectorsHave Heightened Duties When Involved
in Takeover Battles, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 1989, at 44,; Louis Lowenstein,
Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83
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In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,53 the Delaware Supreme Court
recognized that directors were faced with a conflict between their own
interests and the interests of the corporation and shareholders when confronted
with a threat to corporate control. 4 The court in Unocal noted that these
situations required an additional step prior to the conference of the protection

COLuM. L. REv. 249, 314-15 (1983); Edward E. Shea, Obligations of
Directors When a Bid is on the Table, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, July/Aug.
1988, at 49; SPARKS ET AL., supra note 2, at 9-60
Martin Lipton has been a supporter of the business judgment rule. See
Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target'sBoardroom;An Update After
One Year, 36 Bus. Law. 1017 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, supra note 3; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman,
Delaware'sIntermediateStandardfor Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance
to ProportionalityReview?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 247 n.1 (1989).
Judge (formerly Professor) Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have argued
that the business judgment rule should not be used to support a decision to
reject a tender offer. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper
Role of a Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV.
L. REv. 1161, 1194-1204 (1981). See also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The CorporateContract, 89 CoLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1417 (1989); see
generally Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the
Rhetoric of Contract,85 COLuM. L. REv. 1403, 1419 n. 3 7 (1985).
Edward F. Greene and James J. Junewicz have argued that the business
judgment rule "fails to provide adequate legal standards for evaluating
defensive tactics," "fails to provide the analytical framework necessary to give
officers and directors adequate guidance" and does not adequately protect
shareholder interests. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 11, at 701, 714. See
also id. at 700-20, 726.
Professor Oesterle has argued that "courts should stop applying the
business judgment doctrine or rule ... in evaluating a target management's
conduct when responding to a hostile tender offer." Oesterle, supra note 43,
at 83. He has stated that "state courts or legislatures should define and
enforce standards of fiduciary misconduct for target management based on
their role as negotiating agents for shareholders." Id. at 82.
53. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
54. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. See also Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v.
Polaroid Corp. (In re Polaroid Shareholders Litigation), 559 A.2d 278, 286
(Del. Ch. 1989); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551
A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988);
Kanner, supra note 52; Shea, supra note 52, at 49-50; SPARKS Er AL., supra
note 2, at 16-18.
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of the business judgment rule. 55 The court stated that an "enhanced
duty [is
56
required] which calls for judicial examination at the threshold."
Unocal considered the business judgment rule in the context of the
adoption of antitakeover measures and formed a two-part testy7 The first
part of this test requires that "directors must show that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness

55. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. See also Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer,
Inc., No. 10428, 1988 WL 140221, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988), Interco,
551 A.2d at 796; Kanner, supra note 52; SPARKS ET AL., supra note 2, at 1618.
56. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
57. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Moran, 500 A.2d at
1355-57; Polaroid,559 A.2d at 286-87; Robert M. Bass Group, Inc., v. Evans
(In re Macmillan, Inc. Shareholders Litigation), 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del.
Ch.), appeal dismissed, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); Interco, 551 A.2d at 796;
AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del.
Ch. 1986); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52; Kanner, supra note 52;
SPARKS Er AL., supra note 2, at 16-18. This is called the "proportionality
test." Interco, 551 A.2d at 796.
Professors Johnson and Siegel have argued that the Unocalrequirements
are "inconsequential." Johnson & Siegel, supra note 2, at 329-39. I disagree
with this position. First, the Unocal test may not be as stringent as Professors
Johnson and Siegel would prefer, but it is more demanding than they
characterize it to be. Also, it is more rigorous than the previous business
judgment rule standard. Second, the transfer of the initial burden of proof
from the plaintiff to the target's board presents a threshold standard that target
boards must satisfy. Third, the Delaware Supreme Court has demonstrated
that the Unocal test is not an "inconsequential" standard, in its holdings in
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986) and in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 551 A.2d 1261 (Del.
1989). Also, the Delaware Court of Chancery has attempted to use the
Unocal test to support its holdings against target boards in City Capital
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal
dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988) and Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. Co.
v. Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co. Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049
(Del. Ch. 1988). I have argued elsewhere in this Article that the Delaware
Court of Chancery misunderstood and/or failed to apply or misapplied the
Unocal test in Interco and Pillsbury. See also Johnson & Siegel, supra note
2, at 329-39.
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existed because of another person's stock ownership."'58 Unocal places the
initial burden on directors to justify their position in the adoption of
antitakeover measures in order to come under the control of the business
judgment rule.59 The Unocal court recognized that directors could satisfy
this burden by a showing of "good faith and reasonable investigation.' ° The
second part of this test requires that directors show that their actions were
"reasonable in relation to the threat posed." 6' If the directors satisfy this

58. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See also Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1990); Johnson & Siegel, supra note
2, at 329-39; Kanner, supra note 52; SPARKS El AL., supra note 2, at 16-18.
59. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954. See also Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152;
Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; Bass, 552 A.2d at 1239; Johnson & Siegel, supra
note 2, at 329-39; Kirk R. Crowder, Note, Recent Developments in the Use of
the Poison PillAntitakeover Defense: Limiting the Business Judgment Rule,
31 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1083, 1090 (1987).
60. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548,
555 (Del. 1964)). See also Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152; Moran, 500 A.2d
at 1356; Interco, 551 A.2d at 796; MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime Computer,
Inc., No. 10428, 1988 WL 140221, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988); Bass, 552
A.2d at 1239; Shea, supra note 52, at 49; SPARKS ET AL., supra note 2, at 1618; Crowder, supra note 59, at 1090 n.39.
61. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See also Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152;
Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litigation,
564 A.2d 342, 348-49, 350-52 (Del. Ch. 1989); Polaroid,559 A.2d at 286-87;
MAI Basic Four,1988 WL 140221, at *3; Bass, 552 A.2d at 1239; Interco,,
551 A.2d at 796; AC Acquisitions, 519 A.2d at 111; Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 52, at 251.
Professors Gilson and Kraakman referred to AC Acquisitions Corp. v.
Anderson, Clayton & Co. to support their contention that "an effective
proportionality test must be more than a threshold test," id. at 266, and that
"[d]efensive tactics must be justified in relationship to particular terms of
hostile offers." Id. at 256. They did recognize that the application of the
proportionality standard was still open to the interpretation of the Delaware
courts. Id. at 252-54.
An indication of the Delaware Court of Chancery's and Delaware
Supreme Court's current interpretation of this standard can be found in
Paramount. The respective courts' Paramountdecisions generally recognize
and approve of a target board's reliance on a long-term corporate strategy
argument to defeat a tender offer, and also recognize other factors. The
opinions indicate that the Delaware courts are interpreting the proportionality
standard as being more of a threshold test and less of a substantive test. This
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two-part test, the burden shifts back to the plaintiffs to show that the directors
breached their fiduciary duty.62 The Unocal court noted that a "corporation
does not have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any
Draconian means available."6
The Unocal court also noted that the
preceding process carries increased weight when properly carried out and
approved by a board consisting of a majority of outside directors."
The Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco, separating the issue of the
poison pill and speaking apart from it, found that the Interco board had acted
in good faith and on an informed basis.6 Why the Interco court did not
apply this analysis, which relies on a standard of good faith and informed
judgment, to the question of whether the poison pill should be redeemed is
unclear, but creates an issue in the court's analysis.66 If the Interco court
had applied such an analysis to the question of the poison pill and had
concluded that the board had acted in good faith and in an informed manner
(or that the board had conducted a reasonable investigation), this determination
would have been sufficient to satisfy the first part of the Unocal test 7 The
court gave no reason for its failure to make this analysis.

represents a move away from the standard supported by Gilson and Kraakman.
See id.; Kanner, supra note 52; Jonathan J. Lerner, Did the Time Decision
Torpedo the Hostile Bid?, MERGERS & ACQUISMONS, Jan./Feb. 1990, at 41,
42; Shea, supra note 52, at 50; SPARKS ET AL., supra note 2, at 16-18,
Crowder, supra note 59, at 1090 n.39.
62. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
63. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See also Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v.
Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co. Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049,
1058 (Del. Ch. 1988).
64. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See also Johnson & Siegel, supra note 2,
at 320.
65. Interco, 551 A.2d at 802-03.
66. Instead of applying a standard based on good faith and informed
judgment, the court in Interco used a two-part standard it identified as
"[t]hreats to voluntariness" and "[t]hreats from 'inadequate' but noncoercive
offers." Id. at 797-800.
67. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See also Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55
(Del. 1964); Interco, 551 A.2d at 796. The first part of the Unocal test
requires that "directors must show that they had reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed because
of another person's stock ownership." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. See also
Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; Interco, 551 A.2d at 796.
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The court in Interco also did not adequately consider whether the Interco
board satisfied the second part of the Unocal test,68 the standard of a
reasonable response."' The court recognized that a board could respond to
a tender offer with a "restructuring" which is the response that the Interco
board had given to the City Capital tender offer.7 As noted previously, the
court recognized that, apart from the poison pill issue, the board had been
appropriately informed and "did explore with expert third parties [Interco's]
value in an LBO transaction." 71 It is difficult to see how after recognizing
that a restructuring is a possible response to a tender offer and the fact that
this restructuring was done on an informed basis, that the Interco court did not
recognize that the board had satisfied the second requirement of the Unocal
test and thus both parts of the Unocal standard.
It is also difficult to understand how the court could justify separating its
evaluation of the restructuring from that of the redemption of the poison pill.
The board's good faith and informed conclusion, as recognized by the Interco
court,7 ' that the restructuring had a value of at least $76 per share provided
the board with a standard of value for the company.73 In judging the
adequacy of all other alternatives, a board has to compare them against the
value of a restructuring. Adequacy of price is probably the most critical issue
in a board's determination as to whether it should redeem a poison pill.74

68. Although the Interco court stated that it did not find the poison pill
reasonable in relation to the threat posed by the offer, Interco, 551 A.2d at
790-91, it did not adequately explain its underlying reasoning. The court
concentrated on applying its own two-part analysis, which it unconvincingly
classified as coming under part one of the Unocal test. See infra note 76.
From this misapplied analysis it arrived at the conclusion that the poison pill
was not reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
69. The second part of the Unocal test requires that directors must show
that their actions were "reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Unocal,
493 A.2d at 955. See also Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; Interco, 551 A.2d at
796; Crowder, supra note 59.
70. Interco, 551 A.2d at 798. See also The Short M & A CasualtyList,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIoNS, May/June 1989, at 17.
71. Interco, 551 A.2d at 803.
72. See supra notes 60, 61 and accompanying text.
73. Interco, 551 A.2d at 795.
74. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173, 180-81 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Adequacy of price is not the only issue that should be considered. Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990).
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It seems inconceivable that a court could find that the board had acted in good
faith and in an informed manner with regard to the restructuring, yet avoid
this conclusion with respect to the issue of redemption of the poison pill,
when one considers the intertwined nature of the two issues.
Instead of applying the business judgment rule and the Unocal test,75 the
Interco court applied a two-part analysis of its own 76 and followed that with
a review of Wasserstein Perella's valuation. 77 The Interco court identified
part one of its two-part test as "[t]hreats to voluntariness. ' The argument
that the court attempted to make was that shareholders ought to be able to
voluntarily decide upon an offer or choose between competing alternatives. 9
The court concluded that the Interco board had used the poison pill to
"preclude shareholder choice.""0

75. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
76. Interco, 551 A.2d at 797-98. The Interco court unconvincingly tried
to classify its two-part test as coming under the first element of the Unocal
test. Id. at 797. This reasoning shows a misunderstanding of the Unocal
standard. When the Interco court's analysis is viewed in its most favorable
light, it is at best a misapplication of the Unocal test. Unocal, 493 A.2d at
955. As argued above, supra part III(A), a proper application of the Unocal
test should lead to conclusions which differ from those arrived at by the
Interco court.
77. Interco, 551 A.2d at 798-800.
78. Id. at 797. The Interco court identifies part two as,'"[t]hreats from
'inadequate' but noncoercive offers." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 799. The Interco court did refer to the holding in Unocal in
its reasoning process, but misinterpreted and misapplied the Unocal holding.
Id. at 796-801. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
In addressing the issue of shareholder choice the court in Interco stated:
Perhaps there is a case in which it is appropriate for a board of
directors to in effect permanently foreclose their shareholders from
accepting a noncoercive offer for their stock by utilization of the
recent innovation of "poison pill" rights. ...
Yet, recognizing the relative closeness of the values and the
impossibility of knowing what the stub share wilf trade at, the
board, having arranged a value maximizing restructuring, elected to
preclude shareholder choice. It did so not to buy time in order to
negotiate or arrange possible alternatives, but asserting in effect a
right and duty to save shareholders from the consequences of the
choice they might make, if permitted to choose.
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The Interco court, when discussing the issue of voluntary shareholder
choice, failed to consider the role of a board of directors in the corporate
decision-making process. The Interco court failed to recognize that the basic
premise upon which the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware is
based "is that directors, rather than shareholders manage the business and
affairs of [a] corporation."81 Delaware Code Annotated title 8, section 141(a)
states in part: "The business and affairs of every corporation organized under
this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors,
except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation."82

Our corporation law exists, not as an isolated body of rules and
principles, but rather in a historical setting and as a part of a larger
body of law premised upon shared values. To acknowledge that
directors may employ the recent innovation of "poison pills" to
deprive shareholders of the ability effectively to choose to accept a
noncoercive offer, after the board has had a reasonable opportunity
to explore or create alternatives, or attempt to negotiate on the
shareholders' behalf, would, it seems to me, be so inconsistent with
widely shared notions of appropriate corporate governance as to
threaten to diminish the legitimacy and authority of our corporation
law.
Id. at 798-800.
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have argued that with respect to
the decision of "whether to accept or reject a tender offer, managers enjoy no
particular comparative advantage over shareholders." Easterbrook & Fischel,
The ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
supra note 52, at 1198. This position does not consider that managers spend
a lot of time getting to know their companies. Also, they have current and
ready access to information that shareholders do not have access to. Further,
they are better informed about current negotiations, strategic business and
legal positions on matters, and other issues, than are shareholders.
81. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). See also DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); Johnson & Siegel, supra note 2, at 320, 320
n.15; The Time Case: Breathing Room for Increasing Values, MERGERS &
AcQUIsITrONS, Sept./Oct. 1989, at 7.
82. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991). See also Paramount,571
A.2d 1140; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811; MAI Basic Four, Inc. v. Prime
Computer, Inc., No. 10428, 1988 WL 140221, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 1988);
The Time Case: BreathingRoom for Increasing Values, supra note 81, at 7;
Johnson & Siegel, supra note 2, at 320, 320 n.15.
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The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal recognized that the management
function of directors includes extraordinary corporate transactions when it
stated: "Even in the traditional areas of fundamental corporate change, i.e.,
charter amendments [8 Del.C. § 242(b)], mergers [8 Del.C. §§ 251(b), 252(c),
253(a), and 254(d)], sale of assets [8 DeLC. § 271(a)], and dissolution [8
DeLC. § 275(a)], director action is a prerequisite to the ultimate disposition
of such matters." 3
Although the Interco court referred to Unocal to support its shareholderchoice contention, it failed to recognize that neither Unocal, which has a fact
pattern similar to Interco's, nor Delaware law in general, requires that
shareholders be given the opportunity to vote to accept an inadequate offer.'
The Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco also did not recognize the
applicability of the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v.

83. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 n.8 (brackets in original). See also Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888 (Del. 1985).
84. Unocal, 493 A.2d 946. See also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont
Mining Corp. (In re Newmont Mining Corp. Shareholders Litigation), 535
A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). These are important cases to consider in analyzing
shareholder choice with respect to Interco. In both these cases, as in Interco,
the bidder made a tender offer at a price that the respective target boards
decided was inadequate. The respective target boards responded to the
inadequate offers by restructuring or recapitalizing their companies. Newmont
issued a large cash dividend and made use of a street sweep. Ivanhoe
Partners,535 A.2d at 1336-37. Unocal issued debt securities in exchange for
stock. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950-51. The shareholders were not given the
opportunity to vote on the tender offer in either Unocal, 493 A.2d 946, or
Ivanhoe Partners,535 A.2d 1334.
The question of the inadequacy of the City Capital offer will be analyzed
later in this Article. See infra part III(C).
Martin Lipton has argued that directors and not shareholders should make
the decision as to whether to accept or reject a takeover bid and that
shareholders can voice their opinions by voting for or against directors. He
has stated, "If the shareholders are dissatisfied with the directors' rejection of
a takeover bid, they have the right, through the normal proxy machinery, to
replace the directors or to instruct the directors to accept a takeover bid."
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, supra note 3, at 116.
Lipton has also stated, "If the shareholders do not like the directors'
decisions, they have the right and power to change the directors." Id. at 120.
I agree with the arguments made by Lipton that shareholders can express
their opinions on directors' decisions through the voting process.
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Household International,Inc.8 The court in Moran based its decision on
Unocal and held that a rights plan could be adopted without a shareholder
vote.6 The Delaware Supreme Court in Moran also determined that, subject
to the Unocalstandard, the board, and not the shareholders by way of voting,
was responsible for deciding whether or not to redeem a poison pill. 7 The
court in Moran held that shareholders could assert their power by exercising
their control over the members of the board.88
The Delaware Court of Chancery's holding in Interco effectively takes
the decision-making process out of the hands of the directors and puts it
almost entirely in the hands of the shareholders. The court in Interco fails to
acknowledge the powers granted to directors under Delaware Code Annotated
title 8, section 141(a), as well as by the holdings in Unocal and Moran.
The holding in TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp.8 9 further
clouds the Delaware Court of Chancery's position on the role of shareholder
voting with respect to management of the business and affairs of a corporation. In discussing the Delaware model of corporate governance, Chancellor
Allen 9° wrote in TW Services:
"Shareholder democracy" is an appealing phrase, and the notion of
shareholders as the ultimate voting constituency of the board has obvious
pertinence, but that phrase would not constitute the only element in a well
articulated model. While corporate democracy is a pertinent concept, a
corporation is not a New England town meeting; directors, not shareholders,
have responsibilities to manage the business and affairs of a corporation,
subject however to a fiduciary obligation. 9'
Chancellor Allen's opinion in TW Services, which supports the position
that directors should manage the business and affairs of a corporation, seems
like a retreat from his decision in Interco, which supported shareholder voting
with respect to the management of a corporation. The inconsistencies of the
Delaware Court of Chancery on this issue make it difficult to determine where
the position of the court ultimately lies. However, the later TW Services

85. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
86. Id. at 1353, 1355. See also Unocal, 493 A.2d at 953.
87. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353-54. Professors Gilson and Kraakman
recognized and commented on the application of the Unocal two-part test to
the poison pill in Moran. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52, at 252-53. See
also Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 2, at 1408-10.
88. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
89. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. March 2, 1989).
90. Chancellor Allen also wrote the Interco decision.
91. TWServs., 1989 WL 20290 at *12 n.14.
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decision, which is more in line with the position of the Delaware Supreme
Court, may signal support in the Delaware Court of Chancery for the position
of directors managing the business and affairs of corporations. 92
B. What is an Excessive Response to a
ParticularTender Offer Proposal?
The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal established that a response to a
takeover proposal must be balanced and "reasonable in relation to the threat
posed"9 3 in order to come under the guidelines of the business judgment
rule.94 The court in Unocal stated:
A further aspect is the element of balance. If a defensive measure is to
come within the ambit of the businessjudgment rule, it must be reasonable
in relation to the threatposed. This entails an analysis by the directors of
the nature of the takeover bid and its effect on the corporate enterprise.
Examples of such concerns may include: inadequacy of the price offered,
nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on
"constituencies" other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of
nonconsummation, and the quality of the securities being offered in the

exchange.95

92. See Moran, 500 A.2d 1346; Unocal, 493 A.2d 946; MAI Basic Four,
Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., No. 10428, 1988 WL 140221 (Del. Ch.Dec. 20,
1988); Meyers, supra note 3; see also infra part IV(E) for a discussion of
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571 A.2d 1140
(Del. 1990).
93. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
94. The court in Unocal, in limiting the response a corporation can make
to a takeover proposal, stated that "[a] corporation does not have unbridled
discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any Draconian means available."
Id.

The "Draconian" response limitation was considered in MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1247 (Del. Ch. 1985),
aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) and recognized in Schwartz, Chancery Court
Ignores DeL Supreme Court Precedents, supra note 3.
95. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (emphasis added). See also Lipton &
Brownstein, supra note 2.
In Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed its Unocal "reasonable
response" position when it stated the following: "In addition, the directors
must show that the defensive mechanism was 'reasonable in relation to the
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In Unocal, the Unocal Corporation responded to Mesa Petroleum Co.'s
tender offer, which it determined to be inadequate, with a self-tender. The
Delaware Supreme Court found Unocal's self-tender a reasonable response to
Mesa's tender offer. 97 In reviewing the Unocal holding, it is difficult to see

threat posed."' Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
See also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. (In re Newmont
Mining Corp. Shareholders Litigation), 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 1987).
96. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956-57.
97. Id. at 955-59. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have argued
that "resistance by a corporation's managers to premium tender offers, even
if it triggers a bidding contest, ultimately decreases shareholder welfare."
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, supra note 52, at 1161. They have also argued
that "the wealth of both investors and society is increased if the managers of
tender offer targets neither resist takeover bids nor seek competing offers for
the targets' securities." Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions
and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1982). This is
known as the "passivity argument." See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for
FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L.
REV. 23 (1982); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra; Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking
CompetitiveBids Versus PurePassivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L.
REv. 51, 66 (1982).
I do not find this argument convincing because it neglects to properly
consider that when looking at each tender offer individually, as opposed to
tender offers as a group, it is difficult to argue that a target's board should not
be allowed to use defensive measures, see Oesterle, supra note 43, at 68-70,
the solicitation of competing offers, see Bebchuk, supra,at 38-39, and/or other
means, see Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, supra note 3,
at 112-24, to attempt to force an offeror (or offerors) to increase the value of
its offer. See also Gregg A. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by
Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a Merge, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 151 (1985).
Although defensive measures should not be so strong as to allow a target's
board to defeat favorable tender offers, nevertheless, this is a long way from
the Easterbrook and Fischel argument of passivity.
Professor Bebchuk has responded to the Easterbrook and Fischel position
by arguing that competing bids are desirable for both target shareholders and
society and that a target's management should be supported in its efforts to
secure competing bids. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1028 (1982);
Bebchuk, The Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers: A Reply and
Extension, supra. He has argued that "auctioneering increases premiums in
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all acquisitions, unfriendly or negotiated, through merger or takeover, whether
management is loyal or self-serving." Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers, supra, at 1045. See Bebchuk, The Case for
FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, supra; Coffee,
supra note 29, at 1161-99; Gilson, supra; Oesterle, supra note 43, at 69-70.
But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra; Schwartz, Search Theory and the
Tender Offer Auction, supra note 3. See generally Kraakman, supra note 8,
at 933-36.
In studying the effects of auctions on takeover premiums Gregg A. Jarrell
concluded:
Over 75 percent of the one hundred litigious targets are acquired,
and their eventual acquisition is, on average, at a significantly higher
takeover premium. Nearly 80 percent of the acquired targets benefit
from lively auctions involving competing bidders or from substantially sweetened offers from the sole suitors. The typical auction
provides an additional 17 percentage points to the already large
initial takeover premium. Moreover, the frequency of auctions
among litigious targets is much larger than that for nonlitigious
targets.
Jarrell, supra, at 174.
Jarrell also concluded that when considering both successful and
unsuccessful takeover attempts, the auction process was still beneficial to
target shareholders, on average. Id.
Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that even resistance that elicits a
higher offer is wasteful because all this does is transfer wealth from the
offeror's shareholders to the target's shareholders. Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 52, at 1175. I would argue that a target management's responsibility is to maximize wealth for its shareholders. It should not be concerned
with the welfare of the bidder's shareholders.
In support of their passivity argument, Easterbrook and Fischel have
argued that bidders invest heavily in research to identify underpriced
corporations and that later bidders take a "free ride" on the first bidders'
research investment. Id. at 1178-79. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
at 3-7; Schwartz, Bebchuk on Minimum Offer Periods, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
271 (1986); Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, supra
note 3.
Bebchuk has argued that while "bidding contests have some adverse
effect on the amount of search done by prospective offerors," there are still
significant rewards for searchers. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers, supra, at 1035-38. See also Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Tender Offers, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1693, 1776-78 (1985); Ronald J. Gilson, A StructuralApproach to
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Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33
STAN. L. REv. 819, 870-72 (1981); Oesterle, supra note 43, at 80-83.
Professor Gilson has argued that competitive bidding may result in
increased allocational efficiencies (As to allocational efficiencies, Bebchuk has
stated that "the auctioneering rule in all likelihood minimizes the friction
involved in moving target assets to their best pogsible uses." Bebchuk, The
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension,
supra, at 39-42. See also Bebchuk, The Case for FacilitatingCompeting
Tender Offers, supra, at 264-68; Oesterle, supra,note 43, at 80-81, 80 n.87.),
and that "for certain kinds of information producers, auctions [may] actually
increase the return on investment in search." Gilson, Seeking Competitive
Bids Versus PurePassivity in Tender Offer Defense, supra, at 51-64; Gilson,
A StructuralApproach to Corporations: The CaseAgainst Defensive Tactics
in Tender Offers, supra, at 872. He suggests that an increase in return on
investment in search can be achieved because "a successful acquisition
requires two different sets of attributes: one involving information production
skills and not very much capital, the other involving the operating skills
required for implementing the takeover and substantially more capital."
Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer
Defense, supra, at 54. But see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, at 13-15, 17-21.
Gilson disagrees with Easterbrook's and Fischel's position that "a series of
independent sales can cause assets to be shifted to their most productive users
as efficiently as competitive bidding in connection with a single sale." Gilson,
Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense,
supra, at 62-64; Gilson, A StructuralApproach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, supra, at 872. But see
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra at 13-15; Schwartz, Search Theory and the
Tender Offer Auction, supra note 3, at 242-44, 249.
I would argue that the large number of tender offers put forth in the
1980's, appears to indicate that the research expense involved in attempting
a tender offer is not much of an obstacle in making an actual tender offer.
The potential gains for a bidder far outweigh the research costs involved. See
Bebchuk, The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers, supra, at 103637; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers:
A Last (?) Reply, 2 J.L. & ECON. & ORG. 253, 255-56 (1986). The best
indicator of the likelihood of a wave of tender offers is probably the
availability of financing. Financing was plentiful for much of the 1980's and
so were the number of tender offers. See Kraakman, supra note 8, at 928-29,
928 n.129.
Easterbrook and Fischel base their position on the idea that investors
cannot identify potential targets prior to the initiation of actual offers.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, at 7-9. I disagree with this position. While
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how the Unocal fact pattern differs substantially from that of Interco. Interco
was faced with a tender offer which it determined to be inadequate."
Interco's board responded to City Capital's inadequate tender offer with a
restructuring." Although the Interco restructuring differed somewhat from
Unocal's self-tender, they were similar in that they both were internal
responses to an inadequate tender offer, as opposed to an external response,
such as a sale to another bidder1l°
Courts must exercise some judgment in determining what is a "reasonable
response" to a tender offer, but the essence of the Unocal holding is that
courts should not overturn the judgment of a board, except in extreme
cases.' 0 ' This is essentially an extension of the business judgment rule.

investors cannot predict potential targets with certainty, investors can identify
companies possessing attributes which may make them more attractive
candidates to a potential bidder. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, supra, at 27-29, 28 nn.1315, 43. Bebchuk has argued that "[t]here are characteristics that make
companies less likely to be targets or more likely to be acquirers" and that
investors "can identify companies as being more likely than average to be
targets." Id. at 27-29, 43.
Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that when a target's management
is faced with a tender offer, it does not have a duty to prevent violations of
the law, such as possible antitrust violations. Easterbrook & Fischel, The
ProperRole of a Target'sManagement in Responding to Tender Offers, supra
note 52, at 1192-94. Their reasoning is that target shareholders are not hurt
by these violations. Id. at 1192-94.
This view does not properly consider potential problems. Treble damages
associated with an antitrust violation could heavily burden target shareholders.
Also, if an approved merger is cancelled due to antitrust violations, this may
signify that the company is for sale and trigger Revlon duties. Further,
violations of Section 13(d) of the Williams Act could have an adverse impact
upon the judgment of target shareholders with respect to tender offers.
98. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787,
792-94 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). The issue
of the adequacy of City Capital's tender offer is discussed infra part III(C).
99. Interco, 551 A.2d at 793-94.
100. It is interesting to note that Unocal recognized that corporate funds
could be used to fight off a raider. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957.
101. Id. at 954. See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 720
(Del. 1971). The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the approach of the
Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco regarding the Court of Chancery's
action of substituting its judgment for that of the Interco board. Paramount
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The Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco reviewed and overturned the
judgment of the Interco board, replacing the judgment of the board with that
of its own. 02 Although the court in Interco did not enjoin the restructuring,'034 it condemned it to defeat by ordering the redemption of the poison
pill.10
The Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco failed to recognize or
consider the Delaware Supreme Court's "element of balance" standard in
Unocal for reviewing defensive responses."0 5 Faced with an offer judged to
be inadequate by its investment banker, the board responded in the proper
manner by protecting the company. 1' 6 The board's response consisted of a
restructuring which involved making short-term cash and securities distributions, as well as the adoption of a poison pill to protect the value of the
company.'0 7 These measures do not preclude the success of a future offer
that is adequate in value. 08 Further, the response of the board is similar to

Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990).
102. Interco, 551 A.2d at 799-800. See also Paramount,571 A.2d at
1153; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720. Professors
Johnson and Siegel have argued that courts have generally refused to secondguess the decision(s) of a board. Johnson & Siegel, supra note 2, at 350. The
Delaware Court of Chancery has shown that it will overturn the decision(s) of
a board of directors. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); Interco, 551 A.2d 787.
103. Interco, 551 A.2d at 800-04.
104. Id. at 799-800.
105. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
106. Interco, 551 A.2d 791-97.
107. Id. at 793-94. Aware of unusual trading activity in Interco's stock,
often a prelude to a tender offer, Interco's board adopted a poison pill on July
11, 1988. Id. at 791. Although the pill was adopted prior to the July 27,
1988 announcement by City Capital of its tender offer, the Interco board
anticipated a possible tender offer, effectively making the adoption of the pill
a response to City Capital's offer. Id. at 792.
108. The poison pill is not a "show stopper," meaning that a poison pill
does not preclude all hostile takeovers. Micheletto, supra note 3, at 113
("Although the preferred dividend plan effectively deters partial, two-tiered
and bootstrap takeover attempts, it is not a 'show stopper."'). See also Moran
v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985) ("the Rights Plan
will not have a severe impact upon proxy contests and it will not preclude all
hostile acquisitions. . . ."); Block & Hoff, supra note 3 ("The 'pill' has not

prevented all tender offers, but it was not intended to do so."); Lipton,
CorporateGovernance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, supra note 3, at
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the positions taken by other boards when faced with an inadequate offer. °9
The response would protect Interco from City Capital's inadequate offer and
give both short and long-term benefits to Interco's shareholders, while keeping
open the possibility that the board would accept an adequate offer."' The
response of the Interco board to City Capital's offer was clearly a "balanced"
response within the standards articulated by the Unocal court."' Neverthe-

69-71 ("The flip-over, however, does nothing to deter raiders able to acquire
majority control and willing to forego a second-step merger."); Rosenzweig,
supra note 3, at 380 n.49, 381-82. The target was forced to remove its poison
pill when the auction was over and the target's board was faced with two bids
that were deemed fair in price by its investment bankers in Mills Acquisition
Co., v. Macmillan, Inc., No. 10168, 1988 WL 108332, at *10, 18-19 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 18, 1988), rev'd, 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989). See also TW Servs., Inc.
v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have argued that a poison pill
could "be used to defeat any bid." Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate
Contract,supra note 52, at 1438. This position seems to overlook the fact
that a poison pill cannot stop an adequate offer.
109. For cases in which the target company's board was faced with an
inadequate tender offer which it correctly rejected, see BNS Inc. v. Koppers
Co., 683 F. Supp. 458 (D. Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining
Corp. (In re Newmont Mining Corp. Shareholders Litigation), 535 A.2d 1334
(Del. 1987); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985);
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984); TWServs., 1989 WL 20290. The
various boards used several methods to defend against the inadequate tender
offers including, but not limited to, a self-tender for a corporation's own
shares, Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950, a refusal to redeem a poison pill, BNS, 683
F. Supp. at 462, TW Servs, 1989 WL 20290, at *1, 5, 11, and dividends,
Ivanhoe Partners,535 A.2d at 1336-37.
110. A board of directors of a company under attack can consider the
long-term effects and implications of their decisions on the target company.
Further, their decisions "are expected to promote corporate (and shareholder)
long run interests, even if short run share value can be expected to be
negatively affected." 7WServs., 1989 WL 20290 at *6-7, 10-11.
111. The "element of balance" in a defensive response to a hostile tender
offer was considered by the court in Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955-56. In
discussing the issue of "balance," the Unocal court stated that "[i]f a defensive
measure is to come within the ambit of the business judgment rule, it must be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Id. at 955. The standard of
"balance" as determined by the "reasonableness" of a response has also been
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less, the court in Interco did not recognize the "balance" standard of Unocal,
nor the satisfaction of that standard by the Interco board. The Interco court
failed to see the balance in the board's overall response. It labeled the
restructuring an "alternative" transaction and tried to apply its test of
voluntariness instead of the standards articulAted by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Unocal...2 The Interco court's application of a voluntariness
standard is misplaced and shows a disregard for the3 Delaware Supreme
Court's standard of "balance" as articulated in Unocal.1
C. An InadequateAll-Cash, All-Shares Tender Offer
Constitutes a Substantial Threat
The Interco court viewed the City Capital offer of $74 per share as a
"mild threat. 1 4 To attempt to determine whether a tender offer is or is not
a threat 15 and the degree of threat seems to fly in the face of reality.
Tender offers" 6 are made by parties to maximize their positions in an effort
to gain control of companies at the most economical price.117 They are not
made with the intention of benefitting shareholders, although in fact
shareholders often do benefit from tender offers.118 Tender offers are not

followed by other courts. See, e.g., BNS, 683 F., Supp. at 473-74; Ivanhoe
Partners,535 A.2d at 1341-43; TWServs., 1989 WL 20290 at *10.
112. Interco, 551 A.2d at 797-98.
113. Schwartz, supra note 3.
114. In referring to the use of the poison pill by the Interco board to
defend against the City Capital offer, the Interco court stated that "[t]he
'threat' here, when viewed with particularity, is far too mild to justify such a
step in this instance." Interco, 551 A.2d at 798.
The Interco court also stated that "the proposed sale of Ethan Allen
Company is a defensive step that is reasonable in relation to the mild threat
posed by this noncoercive $74 cash offer." Id. at 801.
115. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52, at 256-60.
116. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 11, at 662-67.
117. One should also consider that some tender offers are made with the
intent of extracting "greenmail" payment from a company. See generally
Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the ManagementEntrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1985). The payment of
greenmail is a cost to a company and, therefore, hurts rather than helps
shareholders. Id. at 1045-56.
118. Tender offers usually increase the market price of a stock, giving
shareholders an opportunity to sell their shares on the open market at a price
greater than the price they would have received prior to the tender offer.
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negotiated offers for the purchase of a company, but rather unilateral offers.
Often tender offers are made when a negotiated transaction is not possible.
Therefore, generally tender offers cannot be viewed as "friendly" and must be
viewed as hostile acts. 9 Tender offers usually threaten the structure and
existence of a target company. 120 Any threat to the
structure or existence
2
of a company must be viewed as a "serious threat." '
Also, since tender offers are made for prices above the market price, accepted
tender offers give shareholders the opportunity to receive more for their shares
than they would have received on the open market prior to the tender offer.
See John R. Wilke & John J. Keller, NCR Agrees to AT&T Takeoverfor $110
a Share, or $7.48 Billion, WALL ST. J., May 7, 1991 at A3; Randall Smith,
NCR's HoldoutBoosted AT&T's Bid by 22%, Yet Opinion Is Split on Tactics,
WALL ST. J., May 7, 1991, at A3.
119. It may be argued that some tender offers are welcome, such as a
competing offer from a party deemed more favorable than a party making the
original offer. Michael Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains from Corporate
Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and
Acquiring Firms,21 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 20-25, 31 (1988). These offers can only
be viewed as favorable in light of the original offer. If the original offer did
not exist, these offers would generally not be welcomed by the target
company. The only tender offer that should be viewed as friendly is one that
is negotiated and/or requested by the company to be acquired and which takes
place in an environment without duress. Most tender offers are not of this
type.
120. Professor Lowenstein has put forth a proposal that calls for all
hostile tender offers to remain open for six months and any response to a
hostile tender offer that entails structural changes to the target to require
shareholder approval. Professor Lowenstein argues that this will allow for a
more rational and efficient auction, and will allow management sufficient time
to properly consider and analyze the situation and make the proper decision(s).
Lowenstein, supra note 52, at 255-57, 317-34.
My chief objection to Professor Lowenstein's proposal is that a waiting
period of six months is excessively long. This makes arranging the financing
of a tender offer more difficult and expensive. Further, it creates much
uncertainty for the future of the target, as well as the bidder, which hampers
corporate planning and is inefficient from an overall perspective. If
implemented, Professor Lowenstein's proposal will probably have the
undesirable effect of decreasing the number of tender offers made. See Jarrell,
supra note 97, at 162-64 (Jarrell found a high incidence of bidders dropping
their bids after one hundred days from the date of their first bid).
121. Martin Lipton has stated that "there is an element of coercion in
every tender offer." Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
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Boards and courts should not concern themselves with determining
whether a tender offer is a threat or in assessing the degree of threat. Tenders
offers are generally hostile acts and so they must be threatening to a company.
What boards and courts should concentrate on, in the tender offer process, is
adequacy of price. 122 If the tender-offer is fair in value, it should generally
be accepted as favorable to a company.23 This may be the case even if it
means that the structure and existence of a company may be affected because
shareholders are getting a fair price in return for their acceptance of a change
in a company's structure or threat to its existence. When the issue of whether
a tender offer is threatening is viewed in this manner, it is incorporated into
the issue of adequacy of price.
A determination as to whether or not a threat is "serious" often involves
a determination as to whether or not a threat is "coercive.' 1 24 The determina-

Corporatism, supra note 3, at 62. See also Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted
Choice and Equal Treatment in CorporateTakeovers, supra note 97, at 171733; Greene & Junewicz, supra note 11, at 679-80; Lowenstein, supra note 52,
at 267; Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered
Takeovers: The "PoisonPill" Preferred, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1964, 1966
(1984); Rosenzweig, supra note 3, at 378.
The SEC has stated that "any tender offer, and particularly any partial
tender offer, involves an element of coercion or pressure." Two-Tier Tender
Offer PricingandNon-Tender Offer PurchasePrograms-AdvanceNotice of
PossibleCommissionAction, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,637, at 86,917 (June 21, 1984).
122. See The Forces Driving the M & A Market in 1989, MERGERS &
AcQuisITIoNs, May/June 1989, at 34, 45.
123. Id.
124. For cases in which the court determined whether a tender offer was
coercive, see Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. (In re Newmont
Mining Corp. Shareholders Litigation), 535 A.2d 1334, 1342-43 (Del. 1987);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956, 958 (Del. 1985);
TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL
20290, *3-4, 8-9 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989); see also Bebchuk, Toward
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in CorporateTakeovers, supra note
97, at 1747-54; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52; Lowenstein, supra note
52, at 267.
Edward F. Greene and James J. Junewicz have argued that, "[a]ny offer
to purchase stock that involves payment of a premium over the market price
results in pressure on shareholders to tender their shares." Greene &
Junewicz, supra note 11, at 679. To support their position, Greene and
Junewicz cited Radol v. Thomas which determined that "any tender offer is
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determination as to coerciveness is often made on the basis of whether a
tender offer is or is not two-tier in nature.
The coerciveness attributed to
likely to be coercive to some degree" "and that such coercion is" "inherent"
"in the tender offer process." Id.(citing Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302,
1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982)). They also cited Professors Brudney and Chirelstein
as supporters of the position that two-step acquisitions with a price differential
are coercive, and Brudney's and Chirelstein's recommendation that equivalent
compensation be paid in both steps of a tender offer. Id. at 679-81 (citing
Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1361-62 (1978)).
125. A two-tier tender offer contains two parts. In the first part, or
"front-end," the bidder pays a high price, usually in cash, for a substantial
portion of the target's stock. In the second part, or "back-end," the bidder
offers cash or securities having a value that is lower than the amount offered
in the first part. When the value of the front-end exceeds the value of the
back-end, which is usually the case in a two-tier tender offer, the offer is
called a "two-tier, front-end loaded" tender offer. See Comment & Jarrell,
supra note 2, at 286; Greene & Junewicz, supra note 11, at 676-77; Lipton,
CorporateGovernance in the Age of Finance Corporatism,supra note 3, at
18-20; Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 2, at 1412-13; Oesterle, supra note
43, at 60-61.
See Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase
Programs-AdvanceNotice of Possible Commission Action, supra note 121,
at 86,915 n.1, 86,922. The two-tier tender offer was a factor in the determination of coerciveness in Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956, 958; Ivanhoe Partners,535
A.2d at 1342-43; and TWServices, 1989 WL at *3-4, 8-9. See also Block &
Hoff, supra note 3; Comment & Jarrell, supra note 2, at 286; Lipton &
Brownstein, supra note 2, at 1412-13.
Edward F. Greene and James J. Junewicz determined that two-tier and
partial tender offers are unfair, coercive and provide successful bidders with
the opportunity to loot a corporation. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 11, at
676-84. They called for regulation of partial and two-tier tender offers. Id.
at 684-93. Such regulation should give shareholders adequate time to make
informed decisions, and also would prohibit two-tier bids "unless equivalent
value is offered in each tier." Id. at 692. They believe that current defensive
measures and other options available to management today, are adequate to
prevent looting and overreaching in partial bids. Id. at 691-93. Martin Lipton
has also called for a limit on partial bids and has suggested a prohibition on
"acquisitions above the ten percent level unless the purchaser offers to
purchase all remaining shares at the highest price paid by the purchaser in the
prior twelve months." Id. at 691. See also Lipton, CorporateGovernance in
the Age of Finance Corporatism, supra note 3, at 60 n.280, 61. Lipton's
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two-tier offers is based on the argument that shareholders are coerced into
tendering for fear that if they do not tender, they will receive the second tier
of the offer which is usually substantially less than the value of the first
tier. 1 6 In such instances, a shareholder is not getting adequate and fair
value for all of his shares. If a board encourages shareholders to tender their
shares to an inadequate offer, those shareholders will also not be getting
adequate and fair value for their shares. Further, the position of a nontendering shareholder can be analogized to that of the shareholder in the twotier scenario. If a shareholder does not tender into the offer (or any second
stage follow-up offer at the same or a lower price), he will be forced to sell
his shares on the open market.'27 After the tender offer is completed, the

proposal would prevent partial and two-tier tender offers.
Robert Comment and Gregg A. Jarrell argue that their study indicated
that two-tier tender offers do not adversely effect shareholder wealth or
tendering behavior when compared against any-or-all offers. Comment &
Jarrell, supra note 2, at 298-99. They found that the mean premium was
56.6% when an any-or-all offer was executed and 55.9% when a two-tier offer
was executed. The mean premium for partial offers dropped to 22.8%. Id.
A study by the SEC found that the average premium for any-or-all tender
offers was 63.4%, while the average blended premium was 55.1% for two-tier
offers and 31.3% for partial tender offers. Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricingand
Non-Tender Offer PurchasePrograms-AdvanceNotice ofPossible Commission Action, supra note 121, at 86,916, 86,926.
126. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. For a discussion of the coercive nature
of two-tier tender offers, see Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair
Shares in CorporateMergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REV. 297, 337
(1974); Finkelstein, supra note 11, at 293; Greene & Junewicz, supra note 11,
at 676-93; Oesterle, supra note 43, at 56-63; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target'sBoardroom, supra note 3, at 113-14; Note, supra note 121, at 1966.
Martin Lipton has argued that two-tier tender offers are abusive. See
Lipton, CorporateGovernance in theAge of FinanceCorporatism,supra note
3, at 15-20. He has called for the elimination of two-tier, front-end loaded
tender offers. Id. at 60 n.280. See also Lipton, CorporateGovernance in the
Age of Finance Corporatism,supra note 3 (discussing the coercive nature of
two-tier tender offers).
In Interco, the Delaware Court of Chancery, in concluding that the City
Capital tender offer was not coercive, observed that the bid was for all the
shares and not a partial offer. Interco, 551 A.2d at 795-96. Partial tender
offers are similar to two-tier tender offers in that all shareholders are not given
the opportunity to receive the highest price for all of their shares.
127. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52, 255 n.29.
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price of the target's stock usually drops substantially." Therefore, a nontendering shareholder selling on the open market will get substantially less
than the tender price for his shares. If a shareholder thinks that the boardendorsed tender offer has a chance of being successful, he is essentially being
coerced into tendering for fear of ending up with an open market price. 2 9
The result is similar to that which is achieved by the two-tier offer in that a
shareholder is coerced into tendering, even if he feels he is not getting fair and
adequate compensation for his shares, for fear of ultimately receiving less for
his shares later.3 0

My position assumes that appraisal is not a desirable option. See
generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting ContractualFreedom in Corporate
Law: The DesirableConstraintson CharterAmendments, 102 HARV. L. REv.
1820, -1852-56 (1989); Bebchuk, Toward Undisputed Choice and Equal
Treatment in Tender Offers, supra note 97, at 1706-08; Greene & Junewicz,
supra note 11, at 687 n.186; Johnson & Siegel, supra note 2, at 339-40.
128. See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 11, at 681.
129. This assumes that a shareholder does not want to go through an
appraisal proceeding.
130. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have argued that managers
should be guided by a fiduciary principle that calls for managers to accept
corporate control transactions that permit "unequal division of gains ...
subject to the constraint that no investor be made worse off by the transaction." Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions,91 YALE L.J. 698, 698, 703-04, 715 (1982). Their reasoning is
that such a standard maximizes investor welfare. Id. But see Oesterle, supra
note 43, at 73-75. This is basically a "Pareto optimality" argument. Coffee,
supra note 29, at 1174 n.76. The position articulated by Easterbrook and
Fischel shares a similarity with the results of a two-tier tender offer in that in
both cases some shareholders will receive more for their shares than others
while generally, it can be argued that no shareholders will be made worse off
by the transaction.
Martin Lipton has argued that all shareholders should be treated in a fair
and equal manner. Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, supra note 3, at 60 n.280. See generally Bebchuk, Toward
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in CorporateTakeovers, supra note
97; Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholdersin CorporateDistributions and Reorganizations,71 CAL. L. REV. 1072 (1983). The Easterbrook
and Fischel position of "unequal division of gains" conflicts with Lipton's
position. I agree with Lipton's position because it is equitable and allows less
room for coercive tactics by corporate raiders.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

35

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 3 [1992], Art. 1
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
(Vol. 57

The Easterbrook and Fischel argument fails to consider and underestimates the power that large institutional investors, incumbent management, and
insiders have, and could utilize to manipulate corporate control transactions
to their advantage at the expense of smaller investors. See Coffee, supra note
29, at 1230-31 (noting that insiders generally have superior information and
outperform the market). If manipulation of this nature is taken to an extreme,
small investors may or may not be hurt by such corporate control transactions,
but they will never benefit substantially. This could lead to fewer small
investors investing in stocks. See Oesterle, supra note 43, at 80.
The Easterbrook and Fischel argument seems to assume that most
investors are willing to invest on the basis that they may have no more than
a 50% chance of gain on their investment. This seems a presumptive position.
I would argue that most investors invest on the premise that their chance for
gain is greater than 50%. Admittedly some investors may accept a lower
chance for gain if the potential gains are greater, but these are not the majority
of investors.
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that investors can diversify their portfolios
to adjust for risk. Easterbrook & Fischel, The CorporateContract,supra note
52, at 1439-41. This assumes that most investors take the time, have the
background and have sufficient information to diversify their portfolios on a
continual basis to adjust for risk. While this assumption may hold for large
institutional investors, it most likely does not hold for the majority of small
investors. See Bebchuk, The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers:
A Reply and Extension, supra note 97, at 29-30; Coffee, supra note 29, at
1216-21 (Bebchuk and Coffee disagree with the Easterbrook and Fischel
position on shareholder portfolio diversification):
Easterbrook and Fischel support their position by arguing the validity of
efficient capital market theory. While arguments can be made for and against
efficient capital market theory, see generally RICHARD A. BREALEY &
STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (3d ed. 1988);

GILSON, supra note 2, at 156-204; Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender
Offer Auction, supra note 3, their argument fails to recognize the position that
this theory holds in the long run more so than in the short run. An argument
based on efficient capital market theory may be less useful when applied to
the usually short-term environment of an attempted corporate control
transaction. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra; THOMAS E. COPELAND & J.
FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POLICY (3d ed. 1988);

see also Coffee, supra note 29, at 1206-11; Lowenstein, supra note 52, at
269-309.
While in theory, the Easterbrook and Fischel position may appear
plausible to some, in practice it most likely would be difficult to employ.
Evidence of this is that in the mid-1980s corporate raiders tried to use two-
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I agree with the decisions handed down by the courts that have made it
clear that tender offers should be accepted or rejected predominantly on the
issue of adequacy of price."' The position that should follow from the
argument of "acceptance based on adequacy of price" is that any price that is
determined to be inadequate should be considered coercive and should
therefore be rejected. This position melds the issue of coercion into the issue
of adequacy of price and results in one question to be answered by boards of
directors and courts, instead of two. When viewed in this manner, the issue
of determining whether or not an offer is coercive, as well as the degree of
coercion, in essence becomes moot.
With respect to guarding against two-tier, front-end loaded tender offers,
the elimination of the requirement of a review as to threat and coercion
presents little difficulty. A bid that does not provide an adequate price to be
offered to all shareholders cannot be considered adequate in nature when
viewed from a broad perspective. Boards are representatives of all the
shareholders and must try to maximize the price received by all shareholders. 2 Therefore, two-tier, front-end loaded tender offers would not satisfy
my definition as to adequacy of price.
34
33
Partial pro rata tender offers' present a slightly different situation.
tier, front-end loaded tender offers in their takeover attempts. Most often the
back end of these offers gave shareholders junk bonds. It can be argued that
these bonds in certain cases put some parties in a position where they were
worse off after the transaction. Indeed, the value of many junk bond offerings
were probably overestimated at their issuance in the 1980s, and many failed
shortly thereafter. The two-tier, front-end loaded tender offer, though, shows
the potential for abuse of a standard such as the one articulated by
Easterbrook and Fischel.
In sum, the Easterbrook and Fischel position does not seem to be
practical in that it offers too much opportunity for abuse and fails to recognize
certain considerations as outlined above. Also, the idea of unequal distribution may seem unconscionable to most and a standard that a majority of
stockholders do not want to adopt. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra.
131. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); TW Servs., Inc. v.
SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. Mar.
2, 1989); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co.
Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
132. See generally Bebchuk, Toward Undisputed Choice and Equal
Treatment in Tender Offers, supranote 97; Brudney, supra note 130, at 111522, 1131-33.
133. A partial pro rata tender offer is an offer for less than all the shares
of a company where the offeror buys stock from all of the shareholders
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Partial pro rata tender offers should be held to a higher standard of acceptability than all-shares offers. Boards must assess the adequacy of the offer, and
determine whether acceptance of the offer is favorable to shareholders (and the
company) from an overall (i.e. strategic) perspective. 3 ' Partial non-pro rata
tender offers 36 possess most of the shortcomings of two-tier, front-end

loaded tender offers and should be reviewed in a similar manner. 37
There is support for my position in the Delaware Supreme Court. In
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,"38 the raider, Pantry

equally, instead of on a "first come, first served" basis. See Comment &
Jarrell, supra note 2, at 286; Greene & Junewicz, supra note 11, at 676, 684;
Lipton, CorporateGovernance in theAge of FinanceCorporatism,supra note
3, at 17-18.
134. See Comment & Jarrell, supra note 2, at 286; see also supra note
125 and accompanying text. Edward F. Greene and James J. Junewicz have
suggested that the response of directors to a partial tender offer be limited to
trying to find an offer for all shares, or to trying to find a more favorable
partial offer for a greater percentage, or to taking action to frustrate the initial
offer. They argue that directors should respond to full tender offers by
recommending acceptance of the offer or attempting to find a more favorable
offer. Directors should not try to frustrate the initial bid without shareholder
approval. Further, they argue that greenmail repurchases should be prohibited
unless approved by shareholders. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 11, at 73032, 738. Cf Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in
CorporateTakeovers, supra note 97.
135. Martin Lipton has called for restrictions on partial offers. Lipton,
CorporateGovernance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, supra note 3, at
61. See also Greene & Junewicz, supra note 11, at 676-93.
136. Because the Williams Act requires that shares be taken pro rata in
a partial tender offer, this point was raised and addressed in order to present
.a complete discussion of the topic. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1988). See also
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate
Takeovers, supra note 97, at 1714-15; Greene & Junewiecz, supra note 11, at
684.
137. Professor Coffee has stated that in the auction process partial bids
should be severely restricted. Coffee, supra note 29, at 1191, 1295. Martin
Lipton has argued that partial tender offers are abusive. Lipton has suggested
that tender offers should be required to be made for all of a company's
common stock. Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism,supra note 3, at 15-20, 61.
138. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss3/1

38

1992]

Kalajian: Kalajian: Controversial World of Corporate Mergers
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

139
Pride, Inc., made an all-cash, all-shares offer for the target, Revlon, Inc.
The court held that the Revlon board was correct in adopting a poison pill to
protect the company and its shareholders against an inadequate tender
offer."4 The court in Revlon did not try to determine the degree of threat
that the inadequate offer posed. Nor did it try to determine whether the offer
was coercive or noncoercive.' 4 The court in Revlon focused its attention
on the issue of adequacy of the price offered. 42 In determining that the
offer was inadequate,
it held that the Revlon board was correct in adopting a
143
poison pill.
It is interesting to note that the Delaware Court of Chancery opinion in
Interco did not discuss the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in Revlon
regarding poison pills.' 44 Considering the importance of the Revlon holding,
this has to be viewed as a gross omission on the part of the Delaware Court
of Chancery in Interco.
There is also precedent in the Delaware Supreme Court in opinions
before Revlon, to support the position that coercion should not enter into the
tender offer review equation for boards or courts. 145 The case of Smith v.
Van Gorkom 6 involved a target company, Trans Union, faced with an allcash, all-shares offer. The court concentrated its analysis on whether the
target's board reached an informed business judgment in evaluating the offer
and whether the board came within the protection of the business judgment
rule. 47 The court addressed the process by which the adequacy of the bid
was determined and concluded that the board did not make its decision on an
informed basis.'4 It is important to note that the court did not discuss or
149
try to determine the degree of threat or coercion represented by the offer.

139. Id. at 177. See generally Kanner, supra note 52.
140. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81.
141. It is important to note that the Revlon court did not say that the
Pantry Pride all-cash, all-shares tender offer was noncoercive.
142. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81.
143. Id. See also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52, at 261.
144. See Schwartz, Chancery Court Ignores Del. Supreme Court
Precedents, supra note 3.
145. Id.
146. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
147. Id. at 874-88. See also Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 2, at 140910.
148. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. See Johnson & Siegel, supra note
2, at 393.
149. See Schwartz, Chancery Court Ignores Del. Supreme Court
Precedents,supra note 3.
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These factors were not important to the court. The court correctly based its
decision on the process used to review the offer.' 50
Some may argue that Van Gorkom is distinguishable from the Interco
scenario and similar scenarios "because it relied on duty of care, rather than
duty of loyalty grounds." ' The implication derived from the Van Gorkom
holding is that most issues, including duty of care and duty of loyalty, are of
minor importance compared to adequacy of price when we consider the broad
picture in the corporate setting.
Further, the argument that Van Gorkom is distinguishable from Interco
(and similar cases), because Van Gorkom involved a board responding to153a
merger proposal rather than a tender offer as in Interco, has little merit.
The common thread between these and many other cases is that an offer is
being made for a company and a determination must be made as to whether
the price offered is adequate. The form of the proposal is not as important as
the value of the offer.
D. What Is the Standardfor an 'Adequate Offer?"
In Interco, City Capital made a $74 per share bid for Interco.' 54 This
offer was $2 per share below the value of the Interco board's restructuring of
$76 per share. 55 In enjoining Interco's poison pill, the court basically
condemned the restructuring and favored City Capital's $74 per share
offer."
In its review, the Interco court noted that the value of the two
offers differed by only 3%.157 As discussed in Part III(A) of this Article, the
court's decision to enjoin the poison pill is difficult to justify when one
considers that the court, in addressing the restructuring, concluded that the
Interco board had .properly informed itself as to the relevant issues involved,

150. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-81, 893.
151. Schwartz, Chancery CourtIgnores Del. Supreme Court Precedents,
supra note 3. See also Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
152. Schwartz, Chancery CourtIgnores Del.Supreme Court Precedents,
supra note 3. See also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261 (Del. 1989); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
153. See Schwartz, Chancery Court Ignores Del. Supreme Court
Precedents,supra note 3.
154. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787,
790 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
155. Id. at 790, 799.
156. Id. at 798-800.
157. Id. at 799.
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including the value of the company in a leveraged buy-out transaction.158
It is also noteworthy that the court in Interco concluded that the Interco board
had acted "prudently and in good faith" in deciding "to pursue the restructuring as an alternative to the [City Capital] [tender] offer.' 159 The court
recognized that the Interco board had satisfied the elements of the business
judgment rule as expressed in Unocal, and yet, in its holding, the court put its
judgment over that of the board.'O
Interco presents problems for boards of directors and those advising
boards as to what constitutes an adequate price. Prior to Interco, boards and
their advisors could generally conclude that if the business judgment rule was
satisfied, they would be safe in the conclusions they reached as to valuations."' The Interco decision clouds the issue. It seems to be saying that
if an offer is made that is close to what the board believes to be the minimum
value of a company, the board should accept the offer even if it believes the
bid to be inadequate.
This raises the question as to what price differential is an acceptable
threshold level. If we are to accept Interco at face value, it is obvious that a
tender offer that is 3% below the value attributed to a company by its board
will be closely scrutinized by the Delaware Court of Chancery and that the
court will probably hold that such an offer should be accepted.' 62 It is
uncertain if the Interco court would have held differently if the fact situation
before it had involved, say, a 4% or 5% differential. 63 The current problem

158. Id. at 803.
159. Id. The court also concluded that the value of the restructuring was
at least $76 per share. Id. at 795.
160. The Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco concluded that the
Interco board had acted in good faith and in an informed manner. Id. at 795,
803. It also concluded that a reasonable shareholder could prefer either the
restructuring or the $74 offer. Id. at 795-96, 799, 803. See also Shea, supra
note 52.
161. In Unocal, the court stated, "A hallmark of the business judgment
rule is that a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board if the
latter's decision can be 'attributed to any rational business purpose."' Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (citing Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). See generally Shea,
supra note 52..
162. Interco, 551 A.2d at 799.
163. The Delaware Court of Chancery held on one occasion that an 8%
differential between a tender offer and a target board's strategic plan was
insufficient to justify not redeeming its poison pill. Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd.
Co. v. Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co. Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d
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for boards is to determine where the Delaware Court of Chancery places the
line of demarcation between acceptance and rejection of an offer. The Interco
decision creates a vagueness in this area of the law and much unnecessary
guessing on the parts of future boards in similar situations. A strict application of the business judgment rule takes this vagueness out of the law and
eliminates the need for guesswork on the part of boards of directors' and those
advising boards.
E. When Should a Board of DirectorsBe Required
to Redeem a Poison Pill?
The point in time at which directors should be required to redeem a
poison pill has been a difficult question for most courts. 16 The Delaware
courts have generally made their determinations based on the facts in each
particular case.1 6
The Delaware courts, as well as some other courts, have indicated that
they are willing to keep a poison pill in place when it is used by the board of
a target company to promote the continuation of an auction in an attempt to
receive the highest possible price for a company. 1
In CRTF Corp. v.

1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
164. In addressing this issue, the Delaware Court of Chancery in
Macmillan stated that this "is necessarily a fact specific determination." Mills
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 94,071, at 91,024 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1988), rev'd, 559 A.2d
1261 (Del. 1989).
165. Id. See also Facet Enters., Inc. v. Prospect Group, Inc., No. 9746,
1988 WL 36140 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988).
166. See CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also In re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litigation,
564 A.2d 342, 350-52 (Del. Ch. 1989).
The court in Doskocil Companies v. Griggy, No. 10,095, 1988 WL
105751 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988) concluded that a poison pill could be kept in
place to protect a company's shareholders from an inadequate offer. Id. at *3.
The court in Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., Nos. 10,173,
10,189, 1988 WL 96192 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) stated that a court "should
not order the redemption of rights where the effect of the redemption would
negatively impact the shareholders' ability to realize full value for their shares.
This is so even if the tender offer is for all cash." Id. at *5 (citations
omitted).
In Facet Enterprises, Inc. v. Prospect Group, Inc., No. 9746, 1988 WL
36140 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988), the court stated with respect to keeping a pill
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FederatedDepartmentStores, Inc.,' 67 a target, Federated Department Stores,
Inc., was faced with two competing two-tier tender offers."" After
considering the advice of its investment bankers, the board of the target
determined that although the offers were close in value, one was superior to
the other. 69 The board redeemed the pill with respect to the more favorable
offer, but not with respect to the less favorable offer. 70 The entity making
the less favorable offer claimed that "the continued existence of a [r]ights
[p]lan in the midst of such an auction usurps to management the prerogative

in place during an auction that an "auction may produce a bid or bids superior
to Prospect's [the hostile raider] current $27.50 per share offer-a result
clearly in the shareholders' best interests. To grant Prospect injunctive relief
at this time would create a significant risk that Prospect could acquire majority
control of Facet [the target] at $27.50 per share." Id. at *7.
Referring to a study by Gregg A. Jarrell on the effects of litigation on
takeover premiums, Professor Oesterle stated that "[a]uctions therefore
occurred more frequently for litigious than for nonlitigious targets, and these
auctions increased takeover premiums by an average of seventeen percent."
Oesterle, supra note 43, at 69-70. He argued that the use of reversible
defensive tactics and the auction process allows a target's management to
extract a higher premium. Id. See generally Jarrell, supra note 97.
167. 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Although CRTF Corp. v.
FederatedDepartment Stores, Inc. was decided by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York and not a Delaware court, a
review of this case is beneficial to my analysis.
168. The court found coercion to be the motivation for one of the offers
being changed from a single-tier, all-cash, all shares offer to a two-tier, frontend loaded, all-cash offer. Id. at 440.
169. Id. at 434-35. Note that the court stated that a mid-$60s offer that
was lower than the later offers considered by the court was found by the board
not to be "grossly inadequate." Id. at 434.
Although the court's opinion does not supply us with useful numbers as
to the valuations performed by the target's investment bankers, it is interesting
to note that only one of the three investment bankers hired by the target to
value the offers could say that one offer was clearly superior to the other.
The other two investment bankers valued the offers as "roughly comparable,"
although one of the investment bankers noted that one of the bids offered
greater long-term value. Id. at 434-35.
Also, note that the offer found by the target's board to be superior was
that of the "white knight." Id. at 437-43.
170. Id. at 433.
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of deciding whether the [o]ffer may be considered by the shareholders." '
The court held that a poison pill could be selectively enforced to further the
auction process and raise the bidding. t

171. Id.
172. Id. at 437-43. Note that this was a Revlon-type auction, and that it
was-not clear that the final offer had been made by the party deemed to have
the less favorable offer. Id. at 443.
The court also noted that if the poison pill were redeemed, the company
would be "vulnerable to a street sweep; to this and other coercive, two-tiered,
front-end loaded tender offers; to a decrease in existing offers; and possibly
to other dangers." Id. at 442.
The court in FacetEnterprises,Inc. v. ProspectGroup,Inc., recognizing
that in the case before it, the redemption of a pill would allow an entity to
engage in a street sweep, stated:
a rights plan could benefit shareholders by deterring a street sweep
or "front-end loaded offer" by a bidder or a third party that could
otherwise end the auction. That same reasoning is persuasive here,
at least at the present time, because even though Prospect disclaims
any intent to engage in a street sweep or coercive offer, without the
Rights Plan in place other interested third parties will remain free to
do so.
Facet Enters., Inc. v. Prospect Group, Inc., No. 9746, 1988 WL 36140, at *6
(Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988) (citation omitted).
Professors Gilson and Kraakman have spoken out against giving
management broad powers to use preclusive defensive tactics against
takeovers and have stated:
Yet, substantive coercion is a slippery concept. To note
abstractly that management might know shareholder interests better
than shareholders themselves do cannot be a basis for rubberstamping management's pro-forma claims in the face of market
skepticism and the enormous opportunity losses that threaten target
shareholders when hostile offers are defeated. Preclusive defensive
tactics are gambles made on behalf of target shareholders by
presumptively self-interested players. Although shareholders may
win or lose in each transaction, they would almost certainly be
better off on average if the gamble were never made in the absence
of meaningful judicial review. By minimizing management's ability
to further its self-interest in selecting its response to a hostile offer,
an effective proportionality test can raise the odds that management
resistance, when it does occur, will increase shareholder value.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52, at 274.
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It is interesting to compare the holding in CRTF Corp. with the holding

Professors Bebchuk, Gilson, Schwartz, Fischel, and Judge Easterbrook
have supported the elimination of obstructive defensive tactics. See Bebchuk,
The Casefor FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension,
supra note 97, at 47; Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal
Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, supra note 97, at 1706; Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 97, at 2-3; Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure
Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, supra note 97, at 51-52, 66; Gilson, A
StructuralApproach to Corporations: The CaseAgainst Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, supra note 97; Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer
Auction, supra note 3, at 238-39; see also Bebchuk, The Casefor Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, supra note 97, at 25 n.8;
Johnson & Siegel, supranote 2, at 408; see generally Johnson & Siegel, supra
note 2, at 336 n.70.
Martin Lipton has stated that if rules "are enacted to eliminate takeover
abuses and impose needed long-term investment objectives on institutional
investors, then the takeover defenses currently used to combat such abuses
will no longer be justified." Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of
Finance Corporatism,supra note 3, at 64-65.
Professor Oesterle has supported the use of defensive tactics that can
quickly be undone if the target's board receives a favorable offer. He calls
defensive tactics of this nature "reversible defensive tactics." Oesterle, supra
note 43, at 68-70, 89. With respect to poison pills, Professor Oesterle stated
that "if target management can negate the c6nversion or redemption features
[of its poison pill] at its option, such plans may be legitimate reversible
tactics, enabling target managers to negotiate on behalf of their shareholders."
Id. at 90, 91 n.126. Most poison pills are structured so that target boards can
redeem the rights at nominal cost. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
While I realize that some management boards will act in their own selfinterest, the view that calls for the elimination of defensive tactics seems to
be an overreaction to the problem. This is especially true when one considers
that target companies are increasingly using independent directors to make
takeover decisions. Also, this position leaves management with less power
and discretion to implement defensive tactics in order to protect a company
from an inadequate offer.
In theory, Lipton's view seems plausible because it rests on the
elimination of takeover abuses and protects institutional investors seeking
long-term investments. However, it is debatable whether these goals are
attainable as a practical matter. Under the current legal structure, Professor
Oesterle's call for "reversible defensive tactics" may be the most practical
position.
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in Interco. In Interco, there was a difference in valuation between the offers
being considered. Although the difference between the proposals was only
3%, the distinction in value was clear in the evaluation and in the minds of
the Interco directors. Based on the opinions of the target's investment bankers
in CRTF Corp., the difference in value between the competing offers was less
clear. Indeed, the offers were so close in value that two of the target's
investment bankers found them to be "roughly comparable."" 3 Yet, the
Interco court struck down the poison pill before it, while the CRTF Corp.
court upheld the poison pill under its consideration. 74 The case for support
of the pill clearly appears stronger in Interco than in CRTF Corp., but this is
not supported by the respective court holdings.' 75
There is a further problem related to the timing of the redemption of a
poison pill. If a bidder is aware that he can force the redemption of a poison
pill at any time prior to the end of a bidding process that culminates with the
highest adequate offer, he is at an advantage. The bidder will try to force the
redemption of a pill at the earliest possible opportunity so that he can acquire
the company at the lowest possible price. There is no incentive or reason for
him to put forth the highest price he is willing to pay for the shares. This will
preclude the shareholders from receiving the highest possible price for their
1 76
shares.
Also, if the poison pill is redeemed too early, there is the possibility that
bidders will use street sweeps, 177 two-tier offers, and other tactics designed
to acquire the shares of a company at a lesser price. 178 Without a poison

173. CRTF Corp., 683 F. Supp. at 434, 435.
174. In Interco, if one accepts the valuation performed by Wasserstein
Perella (Interco's investment banker) as accurate, there was a clear difference
of $2 per share in value between the two choices before the Interco board.
175. This might be attributable to the fact that Interco was decided by the
Delaware Court of Chancery and CRTF Corp. was decided by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
176. In some cases, it will not even allow the shareholders to get an
adequate price for their shares.
177. The term "'[s]treet sweep' refers to the rapid acquisition of securities
on the open market during and shortly after the pendency of a tender offer for
the same class of securities. The shares are ordinarily purchased at a premium
from arbitrageurs." Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. (In re
Newmont Mining Corp. Shareholders Litigation), 535 A.2d 1334, 1337 n.3
(Del. 1987).
178. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. See also In re Holly
Farms Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 564 A.2d 342, 351 (Del. Ch. 1989).
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pill in place, these tactics can be used by the primary hostile bidder, as well
as by any interested third party.'79

IV. THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY PROVIDES FURTHER
INSIGHT INTO ITS POSITION ON TOPICS IN THE
AREA OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

A. The Delaware Court of Chancery Decisions that Have
Followed Interco Have Created Greater Uncertainty
as to the Court's Position with Respect to Poison Pills
In order to examine the Delaware Court of Chancery's position' with
respect to poison pills, it is necessary to undertake an analysis of the court's
decisions beyond Interco.'80 A review of the Delaware Court of Chancery's
holdings in Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co.,"' T.W.
Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp.,'82 and ParamountCommunications,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 8 3 three cases that followed soon after Interco, is critical
to gaining a greater understanding of the court's position in this area of the
law. As Interco was the forerunner of these cases, it provides a backdrop
from which to compare and contrast these opinions. While each case is
decided on its own facts, a greater understanding of the Delaware Court of
Chancery's position regarding poison pills is gained through analyzing these
cases as a group or series in progression, rather than by considering each case
in isolation.
B. The Delaware Court of Chancery's Opinion
in Pillsbury Supports Its Holding in Interco
In Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co.,' 84 a hostile
raider, Grand Metropolitan Public Limited Company, made an all-cash, allshares offer for The Pillsbury Company, a target, at $63 per share.'8 Based

179. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
180. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del.
1988).
181. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
182. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
183. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989), aft'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
184. (In re Pillsbury Co. Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049 (Del.
Ch. 1988).
185. Id. at 1052. See also Schwartz, Chancery Court Ignores Del.
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on the advice of its experts who valued the target at $68 per share, the target
company's board rejected the bid as inadequate and left the poison pill in
place."8 They further responded by proposing a plan that involved the spinoff and sale of some of the target's business units. 187 The intent of the
proposed plan was to raise the company's value to $68 per share."
The raider instituted an action to force the board to redeem the pill." 9
The Delaware Court of Chancery determined "that the [b]oard's decision to
keep the [p]ill in place was not reasonable in relationship to any threat posed
and, therefore, the [b]oard's decision [was] not protected by the business
judgment rule."' 9 The court ordered the target's board to redeem its
19
pill. '

Unlike the Interco court, the Pillsbury court relied upon the Unocal
decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in arriving at its holding.192 In
applying the Unocal criteria to the facts in Pillsbury, the court found that the
target's board had acted in good faith and had undertaken a reasonable
investigation with respect to the tender offer.193 The court also determined
that a majority of the target's directors were outside, independent directors. 194

Supreme CourtPrecedents,supra note 3 (discussing Grand Metro. Public Ltd.
Co. v. Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co. Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d
1049 (Del. Ch. 1988)).
186. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1053-55, 1057-58.
187. Id. at 1057.
188. Id.
189. Interestingly, the raider as well as its co-plaintiffs, the shareholders
wishing to sell to the raider, relied on the Interco decision to support their
position that the pill should be redeemed. Id. at 1053-54.
190. Id. at 1060.
191. Id. at 1059-60.
192. As explained earlier in this Article, supra part III(A), the Interco
court paid lip service to the Unocal holding and applied its own two-part test
based on "threats to voluntariness" and "threats to economic interest." City
Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797 (Del. Ch.),
appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). Although I disagree in part
with the Delaware Court of Chancery's application of the Unocal standard in
Pillsbury, it is commendable that the court did recognize the applicability of
the standard to the facts under its review.
193. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1056.
194. The court concluded that twelve of the target's fourteen directors
were independent. Id.
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The Pillsbury court, nevertheless, concluded that the board failed to
satisfy the requirements of the Unocal test. 5 The court based its conclusion on its determination that "no showing ha[d] been made. that there would
be a danger to policy or effectiveness of the... [target corporation] ...if the

[r]ights [preferred stock purchase rights associated with the poison pill] were
redeemed and/or Grand Met succeed[ed] in its [tiender [o]ffer."'" The court
went on to state that "[w]hatever danger there
[was] relate[d] solely to
97
shareholders and that concern[ed] price only.'
I disagree with the court's determination in Pillsbury that redeeming the
pill would not present a danger to the target corporation. 9 My objection
to the court's determination is based largely on the court's consideration of the
issue of price and failure to recognize the importance of this issue.' 99 The
court paid little attention to the fact that a $5 or 8% per share spread existed
between the alternatives presented to the target's board.
This represents
a significant amount. Inadequacy of price has generally been held by the
Delaware courts to be a major reason to reject a tender offer. 2°' Basically,

195. Id. at 1055.
196. Id. at 1056. This is basically the standard announced in Unocal,
that a response "must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed." Unocal,
493 A.2d at 955.
197. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1056.
198. The argument that the Delaware Court of Chancery's actions to
force the redemption of the poison pill were simply intended to give the
target's shareholders the opportunity to choose between the tender offer and
the company's alternative offer, overlooks certain issues. Id. at 1057-58.
First, the redemption of the pill ends the bidding process and forecloses the
possibility of higher offers. Also, it is difficult to determine when the bidding
process has actually ended. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559
A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988). Therefore, any choice by shareholders at this time
may be a choice between less than optimal offers. Second, the opinion, which
states, among other facts that, "87% of the Pillsbury shares have been tendered
into the [tender] [o]ffer," Pillsbury,558 A.2d at 1058, indicates that the court
knew that its actions favoring the redemption of the poison pill would lead to
only one result, which was that the tender offer would be approved by the
shareholders.
199. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1056-58.
200. The court stated that "the real threat to shareholder value ...is not
the spread between $63 and $68 per share." Id. at 1058.
201. The Delaware courts have upheld a target board's rejection of an
offer based predominantly on a determination of inadequacy of price in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Ivanhoe
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what the Delaware Court of Chancery did, was to accept as fact, the
statements of the raider's investment bankers and other experts that the $63
per share offer was a fair and possibly even generous offer.' The court did
not seem to really believe the position of the board of the target that the
company was really worth $68 per share.2 3
The Delaware Court of Chancery took a similar position in Interco with
respect to the valuation done by Wasserstein Perella, Interco's investment
banker. The Interco court questioned the validity of Wasserstein Perella's
valuation of Interco at $76 per share. 2"
The court's conclusion in Pillsbury, questioning the target board's
acceptance of the valuation carried out by the target's investment banker, is
difficult to accept in light of its determination that the target's board acted in
good faith, made a reasonable investigation of the situation, and was
composed of a majority of outside, independent directors.' ° If Pillsbury is
read in isolation or along with Interco, one might believe that the issues of
good faith, reasonable investigation, and outside, independent directors were
of little importance. If this were true, the implications for boards of directors
would be great. Pillsbury essentially strips the business judgment rule of its
power to protect and shield boards. Boards of directors are left with little
protection after Pillsbury. In Pillsbury, the Delaware Court of Chancery held
against the target's board even though in the court's own judgment, the board
substantially satisfied the elements of the business judgment rule. 2 6 The
Pillsbury decision could have a detrimental effect on the way boards act in the
future. Boards may hesitate to reject any offer for fear of a lawsuit and

Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. (In re Newmont Mining Corp. Shareholders Litigation), 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987); and TW Services, Inc. v. SWT
Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2,
1989).
202. Pillsbury,558 A.2d at 1057-58. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
203. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1057-58.
204. The Interco court commented on the Wasserstein Perella valuation
and called it "a highly debatable proposition." City Capital Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed,
556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
205. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1056.
206. Id. The court's main objection in Pillsbury was that the target
board's response to the offer was not reasonable. Id. at 1055-56. My
objection to this conclusion, as I have previously stated in this Article, is that
the court did not properly consider the adequacy of price issue. See supra
part III(C).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss3/1

50

1992]

Kalajian: Kalajian: Controversial World of Corporate Mergers
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS

review by a court. Boards will be reluctant to push for the highest possible
price in certain situations. 20 7 Raiders, knowing that boards will be reluctant
to pursue the highest possible price, will use this to their advantage and not
bid as high as they would have when faced with a board that was confident
in the protection afforded them by a stable business judgment rule. Generally,
you will see boards redeeming pills earlier in the sales process, and accepting
lower and often inadequate prices for the companies they represent.
Pillsbury also presents similar problems for those advising boards, such
as attorneys and investment bankers. The protection afforded by the business
judgment rule is highly questionable after Pillsbury. The Delaware Court of
Chancery has shown that it will substitute its judgment for that of the board
of a company. 0 s
The Delaware Court of Chancery has also shown that while it has not
struck down a valuation as totally false, it will question its validity.0 9
Alarmingly, the court questions the validity of valuations with almost no

207. Boards may be reluctant to wait for a higher price when there is the
possibility that they may lose a bidder. The impact of this potentiality is even
greater if a board has only one entity bidding for the company.
208. The court in Pillsbury recognized that a Delaware court is not
supposed to substitute its judgment for that of a board when it stated that "a
Delaware court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board, provided
that the answer the Board gave can be 'attributed to any rational business
purpose,' and, provided further, that it is determined that the standards
required by Unocal have been met." Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1055 (citations
omitted) (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 726 (Del.
1971)). Earlier in this part of the Article, I commented on the Pillsbury
court's interpretation of the Unocal standard, and expressed my objections to
aspects of the court's application of this standard.
The business purpose rule was described and discussed in Singer v.
Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Tanzer v. International General
Industries, Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); and Roland International Corp.
v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979). With respect to the business purpose
rule discussed in these three cases, the Delaware Supreme Court stated, "[W]e
consider that the business purpose requirement of these cases is no longer the
law of Delaware." Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 704 (Del. 1983).
See also GILSON, supra note 2, at 904-07. Given that Weinberger did away
with the business purpose standard, it is not clear why the Delaware Court of
Chancery in Pillsbury tried to rely on a somewhat similar standard. See
Sinclair,280 A.2d at 720.
209. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1057-58. See also City Capital Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798-800. (Del. Ch.), appeal
dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
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mention as to why a valuation may be questionable. This means that even a
valuation that conforms with generally accepted principles of valuation may
be looked down upon by the court."'
The issue of adequacy of price seems to be clouded. In Interco and
Pillsbury, the Delaware Court of Chancery essentially told the boards of the
target corporations that they should accept a price that, in their good faith
judgment and based on reasonable investigation, was inadequate. This makes
it difficult to advise boards in the future to turn down an offer that is lower
in price than the type of offer that a board and its advisors may deem to be
adequate.
Lastly, how close does an offer have to be to what a board sees as an
adequate price, before a court will force a board to redeem its pill and accept
an offer? In Interco, we saw that the Delaware Court of Chancery felt that
3% was close enough for the board to redeem the pill and accept the
offer.2 ' In Pillsbury, 8% was deemed sufficient by the court for the board
to redeem the pill and accept the offer.22 Exactly how far the Delaware
Court of Chancery will go and what it views as acceptable is difficult to
determine, but it helps raiders in their bids for companies. Knowing that they
do not have to make offers that are considered adequate by target boards in
order to get pills redeemed and offers accepted, raiders will make lower bids
and take their chances on litigation. Ironically, the litigation will probably
cost less than the amount they would have had to pay if they made offers
viewed as adequate by the companies. This will result in shareholders
receiving less for their shares. Part of the money saved by not paying
shareholders a higher price for their shares will go to paying legal fees. The
net result is that raiders will be able to acquire companies at lower overall
costs.
The result of the Interco and Pillsbury holdings are that in the long run,
the shareholders will be the real losers. Shareholders will generally receive

210. The Delaware Supreme Court, in addressing the issue of valuation,
stated:
Accordingly, the standard "Delaware block" or weighted average
method of valuation, formerly employed in appraisal and other stock
valuation cases, shall no longer exclusively control such proceedings. We believe that a more liberal approach must include proof
of value by any techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise
admissable in court, subject only to our interpretation of 8 Del.C.
§ 262(h).
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712-13.
211. Interco, 551 A.2d at 799.
212. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1058.
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less for their shares. Ironically, this is what the Delaware Court of Chancery
was trying to prevent in Interco and Pillsbury. These holdings provide a
dangerous precedent for the future and run counter to the intent of the
Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco and Pillsbury.
C. The Delaware Court of Chancery Has Failed to
Directly Address and Rectify the CentralProblem
Before It in Interco and Pillsbury-Valuation
The central problem before the Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco
and Pillsbury is valuation. Indeed, this may be the central problem in most
merger and acquisition transactions. It is a major issue with respect to
redemption of poison pills.
Although valuation is of great importance, the Delaware Court of
Chancery failed to adequately address the problem in both Interco and
Pillsbury. The fact patterns and issues in both of these cases are such that
they presented the Delaware Court of Chancery with a prime opportunity to
address the valuation issue, but the court simply passed up the opportunity.
The problem with valuation is that the rules courts find acceptable for
valuation by investment bankers and other advisors 1 3 are so broad that they
allow the entity doing the valuation to easily arrive at a number that best suits
its position."' This is done by using the valuation method which is most

213. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have noted that "[t]he
advice of investment bankers or other experts is inexact and quite expensive."
Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, supra note 52, at 1200.
214. Professors Gilson and Kraakman have called for greater specificity
and accountability by investment bankers in evaluating management plans and
their potential for future value. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52, at 272-73.
I support a position that calls for such a standard to be applied to all offers
and plans of both offerors and target managements.
In Interco, the target company's investment banker analyzed the target
company and arrived at what is referred to as a "reference range" for the
company as a whole of $68-$80 per share. Interco, 551 A.2d at 792. Two
weeks after this announcement, and after further study, the target company's
investment banker revised its reference range to $74-$87 per share. Id. See
also George Anders & Francine Schwadel, Wall Streeters Helped Interco
Defeat Raiders But at a Heavy Price,WALL ST. J., July 11, 1990, at Al.
In AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103
(Del Ch. 1986), the target company's investment banker analyzed the target
company with respect to recapitalization and arrived at an initial trading range
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favorable to the advisor's position and by properly manipulating that
method. 2u Prior to 1983, the Delaware courts recognized the "Delaware
block" or weighted average method as the accepted method of valuation. 1 6
21 7
In 1983, the Delaware Supreme Court in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.
asserted that other valuation techniques that were accepted in the financial
community could be used to value a company.218 In doing this, the court
allowed investment bankers and others doing valuations almost unbridled
discretion in choosing the valuation method that best supported their positions.
This has resulted in the problem that we have today, which is that each side
in a hostile takeover setting has experts who perform valuations that often
differ sufficiently to lead one or both sides to pursue litigation.2
This problem might be resolved if one supports the position that the
courts are capable of listening to competing valuation arguments and making
a final determination. 220 This argument suffers from several shortcomings.

for the target's stock of $6-10 per share and valued the recapitalization at
$43-$47 per share. Id. at 106. Four months later these numbers were revised
to $13-$18 per share for the trading range of the stock and a value of as high
as $55 per share for the recapitalization. Id. at 107. The revised values were
attributed to a fall in interest rates and a general increase in the value of
securities. Id.
Interestingly, in both Interco and AC Acquisitions, a tender offer was
made after the initial valuation and prior to the follow-up valuation which fell
within or exceeded the range of the initial valuation, but was arguably below
the value arrived at in the follow-up valuation in AC Acquisitions, 519 A.2d
at 106-07, and clearly below the value range arrived at in the follow-up
valuation in Interco, 551 A.2d at 792-93.
215. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
216.. The Delaware block method of valuation determines value by three
different methods: asset value, earnings value, and market value. Each of the
three values are weighted and added to arrive at a value per share. See
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983); GILSON, supra note
2, at 905-06.
217. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
218. Id. at 712-13. See supra note 210 and accompanying text; see also
In re McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997, 1003 (Me. 1989); GILsON, supra note
2, at 905-06.
219. Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have noted that a board of
directors can set an "unrealistic" selling price for a corporation which will
make a sale impossible. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract,
supra note 52, at 1438.
220. This is what essentially happened in Interco and Pillsbury. The
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First, this proposal does not help boards of directors at the critical time in the
takeover process, which is when they have to decide on such issues as
adequacy of price, acceptance of a tender offer, and whether to redeem a pill.
A solution must help boards during this critical time period to address the
many important issues before them.
Second, this solution may lead to more litigation. Since the parties have
no standards by which to determine the validity of the valuations they are
considering and the strength of their position vis-a-vis their opponents', there
is less reason to try for an amicable settlement. They will simply let the
courts decide.
Third, the courts in most cases do not possess the background required
to review a valuation.22' Courts will probably require expert third parties
to assist them in analyzing valuations. This makes the litigation process more
costly and time-consuming than it is in its present form. Also, the question
of who is to pay the increased costs generated by a third party expert and
other related costs raises another issue that will have to be resolved. 2

Delaware Court of Chancery, in each case, listened to the respective
valuations on both sides of the litigation, and although it tried to avoid making
a determination, the court made a hesitant and reserved determination as to
which valuation it felt was accurate. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v.
Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co. Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049,
1057 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc.,
551 A.2d 787, 799 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
The Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco and Pillsbury did not use
definitive language in its holdings and did not set valuation guidelines or
standards that could be followed in the future. The court, in both cases,
largely passed on the valuation issue.
221. Professors Gilson and Kraakman take the position that courts are
adequately equipped to review valuations and have stated, "Although courts
are not better equipped to evaluate management's representations about future
value than the market, the important point is that courts do not need to be
more expert than the market to play a screening role." Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 52, at 273.
Valuations are a business function. They are actually performed by
investment bankers or others that are trained in this specialty. Few judges
possess the required background that would allow them to properly evaluate
a valuation without the assistance of an expert third party. Forcing judges
who do not possess the required background to make such evaluations will be
doing an injustice in many cases to those parties that are adversely affected
by a judge's often improper conclusion.
222. An argument can be made that the valuation problem might be
solved by using arbitrators who have backgrounds in valuation to decide these
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What is needed is a more formalized approach to valuation. We need an
approach that is sufficiently clear to lead different parties to roughly the same
price in valuing a company. We must do away with our current system which
allows for a multitude of approaches that have few if any standards and that
are often based on arbitrary projections of a firm's cash flow and growth.2 u
There are, at present, rules that govern conduct and acceptable practices
for attorneys and accountants in their respective professions.22 4 Rules must
be developed to govern investment bankers and others in the acceptable
standards for the valuation process. If such rules are not followed by those
parties conducting valuations, courts should hold the offending parties
responsible and not place the blame on directors who generally do not possess
training in the valuation area.
While standards for valuations is a topic in itself worthy of in-depth
study, and beyond the scope of this Article, I generally envision a system that
is based on concrete values and statistics currently in the market. A system

disputes. The use of such arbitrators suffers from most of the pitfalls that I
have identified with respect to letting the courts decide upon valuations. In
addition, the use of arbitrators may suffer from another problem which is that
the losing party may look to the courts for a favorable decision. Unless the
arbitrator's decision can be enforced as final, without appeal to a court, the
arbitration process may only lengthen the existing process.
223. Many of the valuation methods used by investment bankers today
are based on cash flow 1rojections. One of the most frequently used methods
of this type is the "discounted cash flow method." Basically, a company's
cash flows are projected into the future and discounted back to the present to
obtain a current value for the company under evaluation. By varying the
growth of the cash flow projections, and using different discount rates, an
investment banker can adjust an evaluation to suit his position. When one
considers that the growth rate chosen for the cash flow projections and the
discount rate are based predominantly on the opinion of the evaluator, and
subject to few if any rules or limitations, it is easy to see how even two
entities using the discounted cash flow method (or any other method similarly
based on projected cash flow), can arrive at two very different valuations. See
BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 130; COPELANCD & WESTON, supra note 130;
GILSON, supra note!2, at 85-155; see generally Kraakman, supra note 8.
224. Statutes and regulations such as the Internal Revenue Code, Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and case law, as well as the American Bar Association Model Code of
Professional Responsibility and the American Bar Association Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, provide standards for attorneys. Accountants are
subject to some of the same statutes such as the Tax Reform Act of 1976, as
well as Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) rulings.
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based on arbitrary projections, subject to few if any standards, will always
lead to varying results. The system must be based more on process and less
on personal choice.
If the valuation process is regulated to produce the results I have
described, the entire takeover process will be more clearly delineated. Target
boards will not be able to rely on arbitrary and unrealistic valuations to reject
tender offers, but will be able to defend companies against inadequate offers
by using accurate and realistic valuations, as well as by relying on the
business judgment rule and the Unocal test. Also, with more clearly
delineated standards, offerors will have a more accurate idea of what it will
truly cost to purchase a particular company. Further, the argument that
management is rejecting an offer for its own interests will be more difficult
to make. Lastly, a valuation which follows and is based on prescribed
standards and regulations will assist those performing valuations in supporting
and defending their work, and make them less vulnerable to attack. The final
result will be a greater number of completed mergers because both offerors
and target boards will be working under similar assumptions and valuations.
As applied to the Interco case, if my valuation proposal had been in place
at the time of the takeover attempt, Interco's investment banker would have'
probably arrived at a different, and possibly lower, valuation price for the
company. 6 This would have put the Interco board in a position such that,

225. Two methods that are currently used to value companies are the
"comparable transaction method" and the "comparable company method."
These methods look at a transaction or a company that is comparable to the
one under evaluation and adjust for differences that may exist between the
comparable transaction or company and the one under evaluation. These
methods suffer from the fact that there does not always exist a comparable
transaction or company for analysis. Further, the adjustment process also
allows for abuses.
In favor of these two methods is that they at least start on data presented
by the market and are not driven by arbitrary projections. While far from
being perfect, these methods may present a starting point from which to devise
a usable and fair method for valuation. Such a method would have to greatly
formalize the current process of both or either of these methods and develop
standards that would eliminate the current abuses allowed by the two methods.
See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 130; COPELAND & WESTON supra note
130; Gilson, supra note 2, at 85-155; see generally Kraakman, supra note 8.
226. This is an assumption that is based on the parameters of my
valuation proposal, the Delaware Court of Chancery opinion in City Capital
Associates Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal
dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988), and on an account of the Interco
proceeding in the Wall Street Journal. See Anders & Schwadel, supra note
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under the business judgment rule and the Unocal test, the board would
probably have had to accept the Rales brothers' $74 per share offer. While
this result is the same as that achieved by the Delaware Court of Chancery
holding, it would have been achieved without establishing the dangerous
precedents that were put forth in the opinion and discussed earlier in this
Article. 7
D. The Delaware Court of Chancery'sHolding in
TW Services May Show a Change in Direction
for the Court
In TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp.,' a hostile raider, SWT
Acquisition Corp., sought a mandatory injunction that would require the target,
TW Services, Inc., to redeem its poison pill. 229 The target's board was
faced with what it and its advisors determined to be an inadequate offer.?0
The Delaware Court of Chancery held that the target did not have to redeem
its poison pill." This holding may have been surprising to some observers
because the facts in TW Services were similar to those in Interco and
Pillsbury.
In TW Services, Chancellor Allen concluded that Interco and

214, at Al.
Note that Interco's investment banker supported and defended the advice
and valuation they provided to Interco's board by saying that it "was based on
Interco management's own budget data" and that "they assumed that
management earnings projections were right." Id. See generally Babette
Morgan, Interco Wins $18 Million from Advisers, ST. LOUIs POST-DISPATCH,
May 9, 1992, at 8C.
227. See supra parts III(A)-(E), IV(A)-(B). Without the adoption and
application of the kinds of standards for valuation that I have articulated and
under the state of the law at the time of the Interco takeover setting, the
decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery is difficult to support in Interco,
especially without a strong economic argument. Essentially, the court
misunderstood and misapplied the Unocal standard which, if properly applied,
should have resulted in a different holding. A better argument to support the
Delaware Court of Chancery's holding under the then current law would have
been an economic argument which the court did not adequately make. The
court was very vague in this area and avoided the core of this argument. See
infra part VI.
228. Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
229. Id. at *1.
230. Id. at *3-4.
231. Id. at *11-12."
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Pillsbury did not make a determination as to whether a target company's
board could maintain its poison pill and pursue its long-term plan of corporate
independence as a response to an inadequate tender offer. 2 He tried to
distinguish TW Services from Interco and Pillsbury 3 on the basis that in
those cases the respective boards did not attempt to manage the companies on
a long-term basis as did the board in TW Services.234 Chancellor Allen also
tried to distinguish the Interco and Pillsbury cases from TW Services on the
grounds that those cases involved a situation where the target's board
formulated its own sale or restructuring alternative. 3s He attempted to
distinguish TW Services from Interco and Pillsbury by stating:
In few instances has this court issued an order requiring a board of
directors to redeem a defensive stock rights plan. In those instances, the
board itself had elected to pursueeither an outright sale of the company and
had completed an auction process, or had elected to pursue a defensive
restructuring that in form and effect was (so far as the corporation itself was
concerned) a close approximation of and an alternative to a pending all cash
tender offer for all shares ....

Those cases did not involve circumstances

in which a board had in good faith (which appears to exist here) elected to
continue managing the enterprise in long term mode and not to actively
consider an extraordinary transaction of any type. Thus, I must disagree
that the issue posed by this case at this juncture is the same issue as was
presented in those cases.'
When closely studied, Chancellor Allen's effort to distinguish TW
Services from Interco and Pillsbury appears to have the effect of greatly
limiting the Delaware Court of Chancery's decisions in Interco and Pillsbury,
possibly to the point that they are almost useless 'as legal precedent.
Chancellor Allen's recognition that a firm may pursue long-term company
plans even at the expense of short-term gains is a major point in the TW
Services opinion, but is unconvincing as a characteristic upon which to
distinguish TW Services from Interco and Pillsbury. 7 Although Interco

232. Id. at *9. See also Schwartz, Chancery CourtIgnoresDeL Supreme
Court Precedents, supra note 3 (discussing TW Servs., 1989 WL 20290).
233. TWServs., 1989 WL 20290, at *9.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. This is especially true with respect to trying to distinguish Pillsbury
from TW Services since the Delaware Court of Chancery in Pillsbury stated
that "[iun response to the [t]ender [o]ffer, the Pillsbury [b]oard has developed
a plan which, it says, provides better long-term value for its stockholders."
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used a different approach than TW Services, its restructuring was intended to
provide long-term growth.3 8 Pillsbury's plan to spin off and sell parts of
its business can also be viewed as a decision based on long-term objectives.? 9 Chancellor Allen attempts to distinguish Interco and Pillsbury from
TWServices on the grounds that the respective boards in Interco and Pillsbury
took positive steps to obtain long-term objectives, whereas the board in TW
Services determined to stay its course to best serve the long-term interests of
the company. This is a difficult argument to support. Further, the court is
questioning the respective boards' judgments as to what is best for each
corporation in the long run. 2'0 This is an extreme position for any court.
This position presumes that a court is in a better position to know what is best
for a company than a company's own board which is undoubtedly more
familiar with the operations of that company and the industry in which it
exists.
Also, based on the holdings in both Interco and Pillsbury, as well as on
the court's comments in TW Services, it seems that the Delaware Court of
Chancery takes the position that raiders are in a better position to manage a
company than a company's own board. This again puts the court's judgment
above that of the board of a company."

Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co. Shareholders
Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1988).
238. The Interco board proposed a restructuring. City Capital Assocs.
Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 793-94 (Del. Ch.), appeal
dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). The board of TW Services decided to
stay with its long-term company plan. TWServs., 1989 WL 20290, at *6.
239. Pillsbury,558 A.2d at 1057. It seems inconsistent and contradictory
that the Delaware Court of Chancery enjoined a spin-off sale proposed by the
target in Pillsbury,but allowed a similar sale under much the same circumstances by the target in Interco. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060-61; Interco,
551 A.2d at 800-01. The Delaware Court of Chancery does not supply points
of distinction or reasons for its contradictory conclusions with respect to this
issue in Interco, Pillsburyor TW Services. TW Servs., 1989 WL 20290.
240. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
241. It is interesting to note that many in the legal community have
openly questioned the judgment of the Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco,
as well as in Pillsbury. Martin Lipton of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz,
counsel to Interco, stated that, "Delaware has misled corporate America."
Lipton later said, "[Delaware] has breached its covenant. It lured companies
in with the promise that the business-judgment rule would govern corporate
law. It's obvious that the state has reneged." Lipton went so far as to suggest
that his clients pull out of Delaware and reincorporate in another state.
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William Meyers, Showdown in Delaware: The Battle to Shape Takeover Law,
INSTITTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1989, at 64, 75. Lipton's comments raise a
point. If corporate America were to adopt the view that Delaware was no
longer a favorable place to incorporate, it would have a negative economic
impact on those industries and fields which have benefited from Delaware's
position as a home for corporate America.
Bruce Wasserstein of Wasserstein Perella, questioned whether Chancellor
Allen "had the ability to analyze a complex restructuring as well as an
investment banker can." Id. at 75.
Probably most telling though is the fact that Delaware Supreme Court
Justice Andrew G.T. Moore II was pleased that it appeared at the time that the
Interco decision would be appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. Justice
Moore, a conservative who is a believer in the business judgment rule, the
poison pill, and a supporter of management, ;as not scheduled to sit on the
three-judge panel that would have heard the appeal, but many in the legal
profession believed that since Justice Moore's "views on corporate law are
held in such high esteem by his benchmates" that the Delaware Supreme
Court would reverse the Delaware Court of Chancery opinion in Interco. Id.
at 67-68, 72, 75.
The objections to the Interco decision may have been best summarized
in an article by William Meyer entitled Showdown in Delaware: The Battle
to Shape Takeover Law. Id. Interestingly, this article appeared in the
February edition of Institutional Investor, which was after the Interco and
Pillsbury holdings, but before the TW Services decision. Due to the fact that
Interco and Pillsburywere not appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, the
Delaware Court of Chancery decisions did not come under the scrutiny of the
upper court. If the Delaware Court of Chancery holding in 7W Services was
in line with its holdings in Interco and Pillsbury, and the case was appealed,
the Delaware Supreme Court would have had a golden opportunity. The
Delaware Supreme Court could have reversed the Delaware Court of
Chancery's decision in TW Services, as well as undercut the significance of
the Interco and Pillsbury holdings. By deciding TW Services in the manner
they did, the Delaware Court of Chancery limited but preserved its opinions
in Interco and Pillsbury and did not give the Delaware Supreme Court the
opportunity to reverse its TW Services decision. While I am not saying that
the Delaware Court of Chancery's holding was based on this reasoning and
a result of Meyer's article, I am suggesting that these are possible factors that
were considered by the Delaware Court of Chancery in TW Services.
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E. The Delaware Court of Chancery'sHolding in
Paramount FurtherSupports the Reasoning of
the Court in TW Services
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,242 the target
company, Time, Inc., was considering a merger with another company,
Warner Communications, Inc., when it was faced with a hostile tender offer
from a third party, Paramount Communications, Inc. 3 Knowing that the
merger might not receive the necessary shareholder approval due to the
existence of the tender offer, the board of the target company restructured the
transaction in a way that would not require it to be put to a shareholder
vote. 2" The party making the tender offer brought suit, seeking a preliminary injunction to stop the target from going ahead with the restructured
transaction."u The court rejected the tender offeror's request for a preliminary injunction.2
The reasoning of the Delaware Court of Chancery in Paramount is
particularly interesting. The court went to great lengths to stress that a board
of directors can forego increases in current value if it has reason to believe
24 7
that a long-term strategy will result in even greater value in the future.
This reinforced the Delaware Court of Chancery's holding in TW Services,
which earlier recognized that a board may decide that a company and its
shareholders may best be served by a long-term business plan even if it has
a negative effect on a company's short-term value.248 Prior to TW Services

242. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch.
July 14, 1989), aft'd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
243. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V
94,514, at 93,265-75.
244. Id. at 93,265-66, 93,272. Note that although the target had a poison
pill in place, the motion did not seek to force the target to redeem its pill. Id.
at 93,265. The issues discussed though, are applicable to future cases
involving the review of poison pills. See Lerner, supra note 61, at 43.
245. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
246. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
94,514, at 93,284.
247. Id. at 93,276-77, 93,283-84. See also Lerner, supra note 61, at 4143; The Time Case: BreathingRoom for Increasing Values, supra note 81,
at 7.
248. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298,
1989 WL 20290, *6-7, 11 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). See also Lerner, supra
note 61, at 41-42; The Time Case: BreathingRoom for Increasing Values,
supra note 81, at 7.
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and Paramount,the argument of long-term gain over short-term value was not
generally recognized by the Delaware Court of Chancery. These holdings
show that future target companies can make this argument with some
confidence that it will be successful. 49
The court in Paramountrecognized that directors, and not shareholders,
are responsible for the management of a company.' 0 While the Paramount
court's restatement of this position may not put an end to the argument that
shareholders should manage a company, it lends further support to the
recognized law in Delawar '
The holding in Paramountis also significant because the court held as
it did, even though it recognized that the target board acted with respect to the
recasting of the merger primarily to avoid having to gain shareholder approval
for the transaction, which the board anticipated it would not be able to
secure. z 2 The court stated that a board of directors did not have to manage
a company in compliance with the desires of those holding a majority of its
shares . 53 This is an extreme position. It helps to support management in
its decision-making capacity. It also gives greater fortification to the business
judgment rule and strengthens the protection it provides to boards that comply
with its standards5 4

249. The Delaware Court of Chancery in Paramountstressed that Time
had a long-term strategic business plan in place prior to the takeover attempt
and that the primary purpose of the plan was not to solidify management's
control of the corporation. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,282-83. Corporations contemplating defensive
measures should consider formulating a long-term strategic business plan.
Such a plan should be periodically reviewed and revised. Also, the plan
should be well documented, as director actions which affect the control of a
company will probably come under much scrutiny by the courts. See Lerner,
supra note 61, at 41-42.
250. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514, at 93,284.
251. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
252. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514, at 93,273, 93,284. See also Lerner, supra note 61, at 43.
253. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514, at 93,284.
254. The Paramount court discussed the business judgment rule. Id. at
93,277, 93,282. The court found that the target's board had acted in good
faith, that its response had been reasonable in relation to the threat posed, and
presumably by its holding, that the board had acted in an informed manner.
Id. at 93,276, 93,283-84, 93,272-73.
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Although the primary issue considered by the Paramount court was the
reformation of a merger, z 5 the successful arguments made by the target in
Paramount and recognized by the court, could also be used by the board of
a target that is trying to defend the validity of its poison pill.5 6 A board of
directors could defend its poison pill by arguing that the poison pill is
protecting and enhancing the firm's prospects of long-term growth at the
possible expense of short-term value5 7 Further, they could argue that it is
a board's responsibility to manage a company and that determinations made
by a board do not have to comply with the desires of shareholders who own
a majority of a company's stock.258 The Paramount opinion, to some
extent, helped to clarify what the Delaware Court of Chancery viewed as
proper action by target boards in a tender offer situation.
The Paramountholding also shows that the trend in the Delaware Court
of Chancery, as begun in TWServices, is toward supporting management, and
away from the pro-shareholder position which was supported by the decisions
in Interco and Pillsbury. While courts usually take the position that each case
stands on its own merits, the Paramountdecision must be viewed as further
undercutting'the opinions of the Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco and
Pillsbury.
One might consider that the target company's transaction in Paramount
in effect restructured the composition of the firm. The proposed actions by
the target boards in Interco and Pillsburywould have had a similar effect with
regard to their respective companies. If future courts were to recognize this
view as valid, it would all but do away with any lasting vestiges of significance that remain in the Interco and Pillsbury opinions.
V. THE DELAWARE SUPREME COURT IN ITS PARAMOUNT OPINION
RESPONDED TO THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY'S SERIES
OF DECISIONS STARTING WITH INTERCO

The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Delaware
Court of Chancery in ParamountCommunications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,S 9 but
differed somewhat in its analysis and reasoning. In affirming the Delaware
Court of Chancery's decision, the Delaware Supreme Court stated:

255. Id. at 93,265, 93,273:75.
256. See Lerner, supra note 61, at 41, 42, 44.
257. See The Time Case: Breathing Room for Increasing Values, supra
note 81, at 7.
258. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514, at 93,276-77, 93,283-84.
259. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
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We find that Paramount's tender offer was reasonably perceived by Time's
board to pose a threat to Time and that the Time board's "response" to that
threat was, under the circumstances, reasonable and proportionate.
Applying Unocal, we reject the argument that the only corporate threat
posed by an all-shares, all-cash tender offer is the possibility of inadequate
value.
We also find that Time's board did not by entering into its initial
merger agreement with Warner come under a Revlon duty either to auction
the company or to maximize short-term shareholder value, notwithstanding
the unequal share exchange. Therefore, the Time board's original plan of
merger with Warner was subject only to a business judgment rule
analysis.2W
The Supreme Court in Paramountapplied the Unocal standard broadly
and the Revlon standard narrowly.2 1 The Delaware Supreme Court rejected
the application of Revlon to the Paramount fact pattern. 2 The court
determined that there was an "absence of any substantial evidence to conclude
that Time's board, in negotiating with Warner, made the dissolution or breakup of the corporate entity inevitable, as was the case in RevIon."263
The Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount observed that Revlon
duties2" may be triggered when a target responds to a tender offer by
abandoning its long-term strategy, and substituting an alternative plan which
involves the break-up of the company in a manner similar to the anticipated
result of the tender offer.2"5 The court determined that Reilon duties are not

260. Id. at 1142.
261. Id. at 1142, 1149-55. See also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Johnson & Siegel, supra note 2, at
340; Kanner, supra note 52.
262. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1150-54.
263. Id. at 1150. See also Johnson & Siegel, supra note 2, at 340;
Kanner, supra note 52.
264. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
265. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1150-51. Martin Lipton has argued that
takeovers can negatively affect long-term planning and thereby adversely
affect the economy. Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, supra
note 3, at 104-05.
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have responded to Lipton's
argument by stating that "[t]he threat of takeovers does not prevent managers
from engaging in long-term planning. If the market perceives that management has developed a successful long-term strategy, this will be reflected in
higher share prices that discourage takeovers." Easterbrook & Fischel, The
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triggered if a board's reaction to an unwanted tender offer is a defensive
response and "not an abandonment of the corporation's continued existence.""66 In such cases Unocal duties apply. 7 The Delaware Supreme
Court concluded that "Time's recasting of its merger agreement with Warner
from a share exchange to a share purchase (did not constitute, on the part of
Time, either
''2 an abandonment of] its strategic plan or made a sale of Time
inevitable. a
The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the initial stock-for-stock
merger between Time and Warner was "entitled to the protection of the
business judgment rule."' The Delaware Court of Chancery had found that
the revised agreement between Time and Warner was defense motivated.270
Therefore, the Delaware Court of Chancery applied the Unocal standard,
rather than the traditional business judgment rule to the revised agreement. 271 The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the Delaware Court of
Chancery's determination that Unocal applied to all defensive actions taken
by Time's directors after they became aware of Paramount's hostile tender
offer.27
The Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery
recognized that a board of directors "is not under any per se duty to maximize
273
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a takeover.n
This gives boards of directors some discretion and latitude in considering
factors other than short-term, share-value maximization within a takeover
context.
The Delaware Supreme Court differed on its position with respect to
several stances taken by the Delaware Court of Chancery on various
issues. 274 While both courts were of the opinion that the facts in Paramount

ProperRole of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
supra note 52, at 1183-84, 1183 n.60.
266. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1150-51 ("The adoption of structural safety
devices alone does not trigger Revlon."). See also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182,
184.
267. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150-51. See also Unocal, 493 A.2d at
955.
268. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1151.
269. Id. at 1152.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1150; Paramount,[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) I 94,514, at 93,277-80.
274. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152-54.
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did not trigger Revlon duties,275 they categorized the Revlon trigger in
different ways.276 The Delaware Supreme Court concentrated on whether
the actions of Time made the "dissolution or break-up of the corporate.entity
inevitable." 77 The Delaware Court of Chancery concentrated on whether
a "change in control" of the corporation had occurred. 278 The Delaware
Supreme Court viewed its position on Revlon claims in this case as based on
"different grounds" than that of the Delaware Court of Chancery. 9 There
is some support for the Delaware Supreme Court's contention in that its°
analysis considers the abandonment of a company's long-term strategy2

275. Id. at 1150-51; Paramount,[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514, at 93,278-80. See also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, 184.
276. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150-51, Paramount, [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) If94,514, at 93,278-80.
277. Id. at 1150. See also Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182, 184.
278. The Delaware Court of Chancery did not state a test to determine
when a change in control had occurred. The court indicated that a determination would have to be made based on the facts in each case. Paramount,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9194,514, at 93,279. See also
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del.
1989); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp. (In re Newmont Mining
Corp. Shareholders Litigation), 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc.
v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182, 184 (Del. 1986);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-56 (Del. 1985);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-78 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice,
480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-16
(Del. 1984). Interestingly, with respect to the original stock-for- stock merger
between Time and Warner, the Delaware Court of Chancery recognized that
"62% of the equity of Time would be owned by former Warner shareholders
after the merger," but concluded that this was "irrelevant for purposes of
making" a Revlon determination. Paramount,[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514, at 93,279.
279. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1150.
280. Martin Lipton has stated:
the policy considerations are overwhelmingly in favor of specific
recognition that the directors not only have the right to make
takeover decisions based on their reasonable business judgment, but
that macrosocioeconomic issues must be considered along with the
long-term interests of the shareholders and the company as a
business enterprise.
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, supra note 3, at 115-16.
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and any transaction that would lead to a bust-up of the corporation 1 in
guiding the court to its determination with regard to whether Revlon duties
have been iriggered s This position seems to differ somewhat from the
change-in-control standard articulated by the Delaware Court of Chancery.3
While the Delaware Supreme Court's analysis appears to differ from the view
expressed by the -Delaware Court of Chancery, the application of these
standards will be the only positive determination as to how these standards in
fact differ from each other. Both standards leave much to the interpretation
of a reviewing court.
In Interco and Pillsbury, the Delaware Court of Chancery rested on its
previously stated position that "suggested that an all-cash, all-shares offer,
falling within a range of values that a shareholder might reasonably prefer,
cannot constitute a legally recognized 'threat' to shareholder interests
sufficient to withstand a Unocal analysis."'
The Delaware Court of
Chancery in Interco and Pillsburyconcluded that any danger that existed was
minimal, and limited to the shareholders and price, and not to the corporation. 285 The Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount determined that the
plaintiff's argument, which was based on the reasoning of the Delaware Court
of Chancery, led to the conclusion that only two types of threats were posed
by a hostile tender offer: (1) the threat of coercion from a two-tier offer; and
(2) "the threat of inadequate value from an all-shares, all-cash offer at a price
below" the present value of a company's shares.2

281. See generally Kraakman, supra note 8, at 913-14.
282. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1150-51.
283. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
94,514, at 93,278-81.
284. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v.
Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co. Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049
(Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551
A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); see also
AC Acquisitions v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).
285. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1056-58; Interco, 551 A.2d at 797-800. See
also Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152.
286. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152-53.
Professors Gilson and Kraakman have argued that hostile tender offers
can pose three types of threats which they categorize as:
(i) opportunity loss, or the Anderson, Clayton dilemma that a hostile
offer might deprive target shareholders of the opportunity to select
a superior alternative offered by target management; (ii) structural
coercion, or the risk that disparate treatment of non-tendering
shareholders might distort shareholders' tender decisions; and,
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The Delaware Supreme Court rejected the Delaware Court of Chancery's
narrow interpretation of Unocal? The Delaware Supreme Court interpreted Unocal broadly and in a manner which gave great support to directors
under the business judgment rule and the Unocal test.28 The Delaware
Supreme Court in Paramountstated:
The usefulness of Unocal as an analytical tool is precisely its
flexibility in the face of a variety of fact scenarios. Unocalis not intended
as an abstract standard; neither is it a structured and mechanistic procedure
of appraisal. Thus, we have said that directors may consider, when
evaluating the threat posed by a takeover bid, the "inadequacy of the price
offered, nature and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on
'constituencies' other than shareholders 9 . .. the risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange." The
open-ended analysis mandated by Unocal is not intended to lead to a simple
mathematical exercise: that is, of comparing the discounted value of TimeWarner's expected trading price at some future date with Paramount's offer
and determining which is the higher. Indeed, in our view, precepts
underlying the business judgment rule militate against a court's engaging
in the process of attempting to appraise and evaluate the relative merits of
a long-term versus a short-term investment goal for shareholders. To
engage in such an exercise is a distortion of the Unocal process and, in
particular, the application of the second part of Unocal'stest, discussed below.

finally, (iii) substantive coercion, or the risk that shareholders will
mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve
management's representations of intrinsic value.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52, at 267. See also Paramount,571 A.2d
at 1153 n.17.
287. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1142, 1152-53.
288. Id. at 1152-55.
289. In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court limited a board's capacity
to consider the interests of constituencies other than shareholders under the
Unocal standard by stating that "[a] board may have regard for various
constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally
related benefits accruing to the stockholders." Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986). See also Johnson
& Siegel, supra note 2, at 341 n.94. It appears that in Paramount, the
Delaware Supreme Court unfortunately pulled back from its position in Revlon
and reverted to its original position as articulated in Unocal. See Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); see also Gilson
& Kraakman, supra note 52, at 259 n.41.
290. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1153 (citation omitted). See supra note 61
and accompanying text.
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The Delaware Supreme Court's interpretation of Unocalallows directors
to consider many factors other than simply price/value in the takeover
" '
context.29
The Delaware Supreme Court determined that the Delaware
Court of Chancery's interpretation of Unocalwas excessively mechanistic and
price/value oriented.292 The Delaware Supreme Court recognized that in
recent cases, the Delaware Court of Chancery had substituted its judgment for
that of the board of directors of a corporation in deciding as to the most
favorable alternative for a corporation in a takeover context. 293 The
Delaware Supreme Court
rejected such actions "as not in keeping with a
2 94
proper Unocal analysis.
The Delaware Supreme Court recognized that the duty to manage a
corporation lies with a corporation's board of directors and not with its
stockholders. 295 The Delaware Court of Chancery seems to have forgotten
this in Interco and Pillsburywhere the court took the decision-making power
away from the respective boards and placed it in the hands of the sharehold2
ers. 96
The Delaware Supreme Court also disagreed with the Delaware Court of
Chancery's review of the board's managerial function through a long-term
versus short-term corporate strategy analysis.297 With respect to this issue,
the court stated, "Thus, the question of 'long-term' versus 'short-term' values
is largely irrelevant because directors, generally, are obliged to charter a
course for a corporation which is in its best interests without regard to a fixed
investment horizon."2 98
The Delaware Supreme Court's attempt to differentiate its approach from
that of the Delaware Court of Chancery's may be more theoretical than
practical.2M In Paramount,the Delaware Supreme Court did recognize and
consider the issue of long-term versus short-term corporate strategy in its

291. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152-53.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 1153. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co. (In re
Pillsbury Co. Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City
Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.),
appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). But see TW Servs., Inc. v.
SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. Mar.
2, 1989).
294. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1153.
295. Id. at 1150, 1154. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991).
296. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d 1049; Interco, 551 A.2d 787.
297. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1150.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1147-51, 1154.
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analysis. 3 0 Further, since most valuations are based on projections, the
issue of long-term versus short-term strategy/value is incorporated into the
takeover methodology and into the facts reviewed by a court.30 1 Therefore,
it does not appear that the Delaware Supreme Court and Delaware Court of
Chancery differed greatly on this point. °
I generally agree with the Delaware Supreme Court's ultimate decision
in Paramount,3 3 especially on the issue of "threat" to shareholders 304 and
its assessment of Interco,3° but I do not agree with several of the positions
taken by the Delaware Supreme Court.'
I am a supporter of the Unocal
standard307 and the business judgment rule,3° but the Delaware Supreme
Court's interpretation of this standard and rule in Paramountgives excessive
support to directors.3 09 After Paramount, directors may be able to support
their decisions by saying little more than that their "actions were part of a
long-term corporate strategy. 31 While I agree with the Delaware Supreme
Court that a mechanistic price valuation should not be the only factor
considered by directors in a takeover context,31' I disagree with the broad
range of factors that the Delaware Supreme Court indicated should be
considered.312 I endorse a standard that requires a price valuation comparison, with a significantly lesser consideration of other factors, and a recognition
of additional factors that are extreme or extraordinary in nature:' 3 My

300. 1& at 1149-55.
301. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 130; COPELAND & WESTON,
supra note 130; GILsON, supra note 2, at 85-155; see generally Kraakman,
supra note 8.
302. See Paramount,571 A.2d at 1149-55; Paramount,[1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,267, 93,269, 93,272, 93,277,
93,278, 93,283, 93,284; see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 130;
COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 130; GILSON, supra note 2, at 85-155.
303. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1141-42, 1149-55.
304. Id. at 1152-53, 1153 n.17. See also supra note 286 and accompanying text.
305. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152-53.
306. Id. at 1149-55.
307. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
308. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152.
309. Id. at 1152.
310. Id. at 1149-55.
311. Id. at 1152-53.
312. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
313. The Kodak judgment in Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Co. (In
re Polaroid Shareholders Litigation), 559 A.2d 278 (Del. Ch. 1989) provides
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standard may not be as different from the Delaware Supreme Court's
standard314 as may at first appear. The Delaware Supreme Court noted that
directors should consider inadequacy of price, nature -and timing of an offer,
illegality, impact on stakeholders other than shareholders, risk of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities being offered. 15 Where the Delaware
Supreme Court seems to consider these items as an issue of price and other
separate factors, 316 I consider all except the issue of stakeholders other than
shareholders to be factors that are interrelated and part of the issue of price.
For example, if a board thought that an offer was illegal on antitrust
grounds3 17 or had little chance of consummation for other reasons, 3 8 then
the price offered would be of little consequence. Similarly, the timing of an
offer and the quality of the securities offered are factors considered in
analyzing the value of an offer.319 Where I differ most with the Delaware

an example of an extreme or extraordinary factor that must be considered by
a target's board. In Polaroid,the target company expected a sizable future
judgment against Kodak. Id. at 280. The court in Polaroidrecognized that
shareholders could not properly value the judgment at the time of the tender
offer and that the dissemination of information would not cure this problem.
Id. at 290. See also Oesterle,'supranote 43, at 58 n.19. Also, the court noted
that disclosure of certain information by the target board could hurt its
bargaining position with respect to the continuing litigation. Polaroid,559
A.2d at 290. Further, a hostile raider, especially if its intent was to break up
the company, might want to settle the case expeditiously and might also be
willing to accept a lesser judgment/offer than would incumbent management
in order to quickly resolve the matter. This would not be in the best interests
of the target's shareholders.
Generally, a target's board should not take any action on any factor in a
takeover setting that will negatively affect shareholder interests.
314. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152-53.
315. Id. at 1153 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Corp., 493 A.2d
946, 955 (Del. 1985)). See also West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens &
Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders Litigation), 542 A.2d 770, 781 n.6
(Del. Ch. 1988).
316. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1153.
317. See J.P. Stevens, 542 A.2d at 778 (target board had to consider
"significant legal uncertainties," including the offeror's cooperation with the
Federal Trade Commission and the refusal of the offeror to divest assets that
the Federal Trade Commission found to be problematic from an antitrust
perspective).
318. Id. at 778, 781 n.6.
319. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1153 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955).
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Supreme Court is whether directors should consider stakeholders other than
shareholders. 3 Shareholders invest in corporations and take most of the
risks? 2' Therefore, shareholders should be the primary parties considered
in a takeover.3 2
This does not mean that I support a standard that requires directors to
maximize short-term shareholder value at all costs and in all cases in a
takeover context.3 u If a board can show with a sufficiently high degree of
certainty that its long-term strategy on a realistic discounted basis will produce

320. Martin Lipton has supported a position that directors should consider
constituencies other than shareholders in the context of a takeover. Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom,supra note 3, at 122, 130. See also
Greene & Junewicz., supra note 11, at 717 n.342, 739; Lipton, Coiporate
Governancein the Age of FinanceCorporatism,supranote 3, at 35-43; 59-60,
60 n.280.
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have argued that target
management does not have a duty to consider the interests of groups other
than the target's shareholders. Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, supra note 52, at
1190-92. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, The CorporateContract,supra note
52, at 1436; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 130, at 703 n.15.
321. See supra note 320 and accompanying text; see also Easterbrook &
Fischel, The Corporate Contract,supra note 52, at 1425.
322. With respect to the issue of considering stakeholders other than
shareholders, the court in Revlon stated:
The Revlon board argued that it acted in good faith in protecting the noteholders because Unocal permits consideration of other
corporate constituencies. Although such considerations may be
permissible, there are fundamental limitations upon that prerogative.
A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging
its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits
accruing to the stockholders. However', such concern for nonstockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active
bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or
maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182
(Del. 1986) (citation omitted). See also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52,
at 259 n.41, 267.
323. See Paramount,571 A.2d at 1149-50, 1152-53.
Martin Lipton has argued that institutional investors focus on securing
profits in the short-term. See Lipton, Corporate Governance .in the Age of
FinanceCorporatism, supra note 3, at 7-9, 7-8 nn.23-26, 63-64.
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greater shareholder value, 24 then the directors should choose this alternative
32 The problem with the Delaware Supreme Court's
in a takeover setting.Y
position is that it allows a board to choose a long-term corporate strategy even
if it finds that such a strategy will produce less shareholder value than a
current offer.32 Further, the court's position is sufficiently permissive to
allow boards to successfully support almost any of their decisions. 27
By applying the standard I have articulated, the Delaware Supreme Court
could have still held in favor of Time, but would not have granted the
apparent powers that it did to incumbent corporate management.3 Such a
standard would guard against overly strong and possibly abusive and

324. This assumes that rules and regulations are instituted to make
valuations based on projections more realistic than is currently the case, where
valuations are performed under little or no regulations or guidelines. See
supra part IV(C).
325. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 130; COPELAND & WESTON,

supra note 130.
326. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152-53. For example, a board could
justify favoring an offer that produces less shareholder value by arguing that
its decision is based on grounds of consideration of constituencies other than
shareholders.
Martin Lipton has argued that institutional investors are concerned about
maximizing short-term profits and that this is detrimental to undervalued
companies and shareholders that are. interested in long-term investment.
Lipton, CorporateGovernance in theAge of FinanceCorporatism,supra note
3, at 7-9, 8 n.26. My proposal is driven by maximization of profits and does
not cater to the desires of any particular group of investors.
327. Id.
328. See Paramount,571 A.2d at 1147-49. The Time board was told by
its investment bankers that if it decided to sell Time, it would probably
receive a price in excess of $250 per share. Since this price is greater than
Paramount's highest offer for Time which was $200 per share, the Delaware
Supreme Court could have justified a holding based purely on inadequacy of
the offer. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCI)
94,514, at 93,272.
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inefficient management? 29 It would also make entrenchment by management, especially inefficient management, more difficult.33 °
Whether the Delaware Supreme Court's Paramount decision will in
reality grant boards as much power as it appears to have granted 331 is
uncertain. One must consider that in Paramountthere was a highly structured
target board,332 with a long-term strategic corporate plan,333 that had
considered and attempted an acquisition prior to the emergence of the tender
offer?'
This is a fact pattern that lends itself to a pro-management
decision.3 35 Also, the proposed Time-Warner merger was analyzed by the
target's investment bankers and found to yield more shareholder value than
the tender offer.33 How strictly the Delaware courts apply the Delaware

329. See Carl C. Icahn, The Case for Takeovers, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan.
29, 1989, at 34; see also Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.,
[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,436, at 92,812 (7th Cir.
May 24, 1989); Coffee, supra note 29, at 1148 n.5, 1152 n.13, 1152-55. But
see Robert B. Reich, Leveraged Buyouts: America Pays the Price, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Jan. 29, 1989, at 32.
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel have argued that an active
takeover market benefits society by giving management incentive to operate
efficiently, and by providing a vehicle to displace inefficient managers. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 130, at 705; Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer,
supra note 52, at 1184.
330. See supra note 329 and accompanying text.
331. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1151-55.
332. Id. at 1143-49. Twelve of Time's sixteen directors were outside,
nonemployee directors and Time formulated a special committee of outside
directors to oversee the Time-Warner merger. Id. at 1147-48. Further, Time's
outside directors often acted independently of management directors with
respect to the Paramount tender offer. Id. See also Paramount, [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,267-3, 93,270.
333. Paramount,571 A.2d at 1144, 1149-51; Paramount,[1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514, at 93,267-68, 93,282, 93,283-84.
334. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1144-47, 1154-55; Paramount, [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 94,514, at 93,267-71, 93,282,
93,284.
335. See generally Paramount,571 A.2d at 1151-55.
336. See supra note 328 and accompanying text. Also, Time's advisors
predicted trading ranges for the shares of the combined Time-Warner of $106$188 for 1990, $159-$247 for 1991, $230-$332 for 1992 and $208-$402 for
1993. Paramount,[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514,
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Supreme Court's Paramount decision to future takeover situations will
determine the true implications of the Paramountdecision.
The strength of the Delaware Supreme Court's Paramountdecision will
have an impact upon the use of poison pills. 37 If the decision is applied in
its truest sense, boards may be able to use the holding to support the use of
poison pills. Boards will claim that pills are part of their long-term corporate
strategy or are protecting such a strategy. A similar argument might even be
used to support more aggressive pills, with lower triggers?3 8 If the
Delaware courts grant such power to boards regarding poison pills, boards will
be allowed to use pills to preclude almost any takeover attempt. 339 This is
just what the court in Moran determined that a poison pill should not be able
to accomplish. 4° The general power to defend against takeovers becomes
even greater when one considers that in addition to an enhanced poison pill,
management can more often depend on state antitakeover statutes34 and the
"just say no" defense. 4

at 93,273.
337. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
338. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 126667 (Del. 1989); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans (In re Macmillan, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation), 552 A.2d 1227, 1230-32 (Del. Ch.), appeal
dismissed, 548 A.2d 498 (Del. 1988); see also Claudia H. Deutsch, Avon
Keeps Ringing, but Wall Street Won't Answer, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1990, § 3,
at 7.
339. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
340. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356. See also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
341. When the poison pill is used in addition to the protection afforded
corporations by state antitakeover statutes such as those recently enacted in
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, the possibility of a successful takeover
attempt is almost completely precluded. See Dean Foust & Tim Smart, The
Merger Parade Runs Into A Brick Wall, Bus. WK., May 14, 1990, at 38;
Vindu P. Goel, Many PennsylvaniaFirms,Labor Groups OpposeAdoption of
Anti-Takeover Bill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 1990, at A14; Vindu P. Goel,
Pennsylvania'sNew Anti-Takeover Law Fuels Controversy, Faces Fight in
Court, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1990, at A16; Diana B. Henriques, A Paradoxical Anti-Takeover Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1990, § 3, at 15; see generally
Greene '& Junewicz, supra note 11, at 652-53, 652 n.21 (discussing first
generation antitakeover statutes).
342. Corporate management can defend against unwanted takeovers by
using the "just say no" defense which takes the position that a board of'
directors can decline to sell a company when faced with an offer. See
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VI. THE HOLDINGS IN INTERCO AND PILLSBURY MAY BE MORE
EASILYJUSTIFIED WHEN ANALYZED FROM AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

Earlier in this Article, I analyzed the holdings in Interco and Pillsbury
from a purely legal perspective. The legal community has generally confined
itself to this perspective. While purely legal analysis is the cornerstone of
review in the legal profession, economic analysis can be a useful tool to
broaden one's understanding.
In this part of the Article, I review Interco and Pillsbury from an
economic perspective. This approach involves analyzing stock prices from the
time that the target suspected that its stock was being purchased with the
possible intent of a takeover attempt, to the close of the takeover process. I
consider whether it is possible to make the argument that the respective
holdings are justified when considered purely on economic grounds.
To better understand the economics involved with respect to these cases,
a listing of critical dates and corresponding stock prices is essential. In the
Paramount,571 A.2d at 1152; Sutton Holdings Corp. v. DeSoto, Inc., Nos.
11221, 11222, 1990 WL 13476 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1990); Paramount,[1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 at 93,279; TW Servs., Inc.
v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 2, 1989); Block & Hoff, supra note 3; see also Mills Acquisition v.
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1989); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-56 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 872-78, 881 (Del. 1985); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del.
1984); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-16 (Del. 1984). Whether the
"just say no" defense is a valid position when a board is faced with an offer
at an adequate price is unclear and not resolved by Paramount. See supra
notes 328, 336 and accompanying text. Regardless, when corporate
management uses an enhanced poison pill and takes the position of a "just say
no" defense, this presents formidable obstacles for an offeror to overcome.
Martin Lipton has stated:
A company need not have a perpetual "for sale" sign on its front
lawn, i.e., there is no requirement that the management or the
directors engage in acquisition discussions at another person's
initiative; on the contrary, a company may have an express policy
of continuing as an independent business enterprise.
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, supra note 3, at 112
(footnote omitted).
He also stated, "[D]irectors are not required when faced with a takeover
bid to declare an auction and seek to sell the company to the highest bidder."
Id.
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case of Interco, Steven and Mitchell Rales started acquiring Interco stock
through City Capital in May 1988.' 3 During May 1988, the closing price
of Interco's stock ranged between $40 1/4 and $43 7/8 per share. 44 The
closing price of $40 1/4 on May 2, 1988, was a low for Interco's stock during
the period of the attempted takeover 45
On July 27, 1988, the Rales brothers filed a Schedule 13D 346 with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which revealed that they owned 8.7%
of Interco's common stock. 7 On this same day, City Capital "offered to
acquire ... [Interco] by merger for a price of $64 per share in cash,

conditioned upon the availability of financing." 31 On July 27, 1988,
Interco's common stock closed at $59 3/8,49
On August 8, prior to the response of the Interco board to the initial $64
offer, City Capital increased its offering price to $70 per share, still contingent
on securing the required financing. 350 Interco's stock closed at $72 1/2 on
August 8.351
On August 15, the Rales brothers announced an all-cash, all-shares tender
offer for the stock of Interco at $70 per share. 5 Interco's stock closed at

343. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787,
791 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
344. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 229 (April,
May, June 1988). For purposes of this analysis, I will use only closing prices
unless otherwise specified. The Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock
Exchange lists fractional share prices in eighths, but I have reduced fractional
share prices where appropriate in this analysis.
345. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 229 (April,
May, June 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 227
(July, Aug., Sept. 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange
226 (Oct., Nov., Dec. 1988).
346. Under Section 13(d)(1)(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
any person who directly or indirectly acquires more than 5% of any equity
security of a class specified in Section 13(d) must file a SEC Schedule 13D
with the Securities and Exchange Commission disclosing that acquisition. 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1990).
347. Interco, 551 A.2d at 792.
348. Id.
349. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 227 (July,
Aug., Sept. 1988).
350. Interco, 551 A.2d at 792.
351. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 227 (July,
Aug., Sept. 1988).
352. Interco, 551 A.2d at 792.
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$72 1/8 on this day.353 The Interco board4 recommended against the $70 per
share offer at its meeting on August 22.5
On August 29 and 30, Interco's common stock closed at $73 1/2 per
price reached by the stock during the course
share. 35 5 This was the3 highest
56
of the takeover process
On September 10, the Rales brothers increased their offer to $72 per
share. 7 On September 12, the next trading day, Interco's stock closed at
$71 3/4.358
proposOn September 19, the Interco board adopted the restructuring
3
al. 35 9 The common stock of Interco closed at $70 3/8 on this day.
On October 18, City Capital further supplemented its offer by raising its
bid to $74 per share. 6' Interco's common stock closed at $70 5/8 on this
day.3 62 This offer was rejected by the Interco board as inadequate at its
meeting on October 19.63
The decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery came down on Interco
on November 1. 31 Interco's common stock closed at $71 3/4 on this
3
day. 6
In analyzing Interco's stock over the course of the takeover process, it is
clear that the stock rose roughly from $40 1/4 per share to a high of $73 1/2

353. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 227 (July,
Aug., Sept. 1988).
354. Interco, 551 A.2d at 792.
355. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 227 (July,
Aug., Sept. 1988).
356. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 229 (April,
May, June 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 227
(July, Aug., Sept. 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange
226 (Oct., Nov., Dec. 1988).
357. Interco, 551 A.2d at 793.
358. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 227 (July,
Aug., Sept. 1988).
359. Interco, 551 A.2d at 793.
360. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 227 (July,
Aug., Sept. 1988).
361. Interco 551 A.2d at 794.
362. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 226 (Oct.,
Nov., Dec. 1988).
363. Interco, 551 A.2d at 794.
364. Id. at 787.
365. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 226 (Oct.,
Nov., Dec. 1988).
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per share.366 This is an increase in value of 83% over a period of several
months.367
When comparing the value of the restructuring against City Capital's final
offer, it is apparent that the two alternatives are close in value. The
restructuring has a value of at least $76 per share.'
City Capital's final
offer was for $74 per share. 69 The difference between these offers is $2 per
share or 3%.370 Further, the $74 tender offer is an all-cash offer, whereas
the restructuring,
with a value according to Wasserstein Perella of at least $76,
371
not.
is
In studying the market's valuation of Interco's stock on October 18, the
date of the $74 per share bid by City Capital, and shortly thereafter, it can be
seen that the stock traded at around $70 and at no time rose above $71
3/4 .3' The market price of roughly $70 per share was below Wasserstein
Perella's $76 valuation for the restructuring.373 When one considers this,
along with the opinion of Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated, which

366. See supra note 356.
367. A period of four or six months can be used, depending on whether
one wants to look at a reference date keyed to the highest closing price of the
stock or keyed to the decision' of the Delaware Court of Chancery, to
determine the increase in value of Interco's stock over the course of the
takeover process. My figure of 83% is based on a four-month reference
period, keyed to the highest closing price for the stock. A six-month reference
period keyed to the decision of the Delaware Court of Chancery would yield
an increase in value of 78%. Since the disparity in the two figures is small,
either can be effectively used to make the point that Interco's stock rose
sharply in value over the course of the takeover process.
368. Interco, 551 A.2d at 794. I am assuming that Wasserstein Perella's
valuation of the restructuring is accurate.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 798-99.
371. Id. at 793-94. The court determined that the tender offer would
result in value to the shareholders at an earlier date. Id. at 798. It is difficult
to determine from the facts in the opinion, describing the timing of the
realization of value of the resructuring, how much of a factor timing may have
been in affecting the values of the two alternatives, when corrected for the
time value of money. Since speculation on this matter will not add to this
analysis, I will not consider the- point beyond recognizing that it was
mentioned by the court in Interco.
372. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 226 (Oct.,
Nov., Dec. 1988).
373. Id. See also Interco, 551 A.2d at 793-94.
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valued the restructuring at between $68.28 and $70.37 per share, one might
conclude that the prospects for Interco were not as favorable as were
perceived by Wasserstein Perella, and that the stock of Interco, as well as the
restructuring, could be fairly valued at approximately $70 per share.3 74 If
this is the conclusion one reaches, then City Capital's $74 tender offer could
be considered a fair offer and preferable to the proposed restructuring.375
In the Pillsbury case, Pillsbury first became aware that Grand Metropolitan had an interest in the company in May of 1988.376 During May 1988,
the closing price for Pillsbury's common stock ranged between $35 1/4 per
share and $40 1/2 per share. 77
On July 19, Pillsbury's stock closed at $33 5/8 per share. 78 This was
the lowest price reached by Pillsbury's stock during the period of this
takeover. 79
During or prior to September 1988, Pillsbury began communicating with
State Alcoholic Beverage Commissions regarding Tied-House relationships.m Pillsbury hoped to use the Tied-House Statutes as a defense if

374. Interco, 551 A.2d at 793-94, 798-800. Drexel Burnham Lambert,
Incorporated was City Capital's investment banker for this transaction. Id. at
799.
375. Interco's board did ultimately institute the proposed restructuring.
For information on the record of the restructuring and Interco in general, see
Anders & Schwadel, supra note 214; Brian Bremner, Interco: Another Day
Older and $1.4 Billion in Debt, BUS. WK., Jan. 22, 1990, at 58; Larry Light,
The Junk Bond Time Bombs Could Go Off, Bus. WK., Apr. 9, 1990, at 68;
Francine Schwadel & George Anders, Interco Bondholders and Banks Agree
to Restructuring of $1.9 Billion Debt, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1990, at A4;
Francine Schwadel & George Anders, Interco and its Banks and Bondholders
Tentatively Agree on Debt Restructuring, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1990, at A7.
376. Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co.
Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1988).
377. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 347 (April,
May, June 1988).
378. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343 (July,
Aug., Sept 1988).
379. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 347 (April,
May, June 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343
(July, Aug., Sept. 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange
343 (Oct., Nov., Dec. 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock
Exchange 338 (Jan., Feb., Mar. 1989).
380. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1052. Tied-House Statutes are statutes that
are in effect in certain states which generally "prohibit a manufacturer of
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Grand Metropolitan made a tender offer.3 1 During the month of September
1988, the closing price of Pillsbury's stock ranged between $34 1/2 per share
and $39 per share.'
On October 3, Grand Metropolitan filed an action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against Pillsbury.3 83 Pillsbury's stock closed at $39 per
share on this day. 4
The next day, on October 4, Grand Metropolitan announced an all-cash
tender offer at $63 per share for all the outstanding stock of Pillsbury-3a
The stock rose on the announcement of the tender offer and closed at $57 on
October 4.3

Pillsbury's board met on October 17 and decided to recommend against
the tender offer.387 The board based its recommendation against the tender
offer largely on its finding that the $63 price was inadequate.3 88 On October
17, Pillsbury's stock closed at $58 5/8." 9
Pillsbury entered into an agreement on November 6 to spin off Burger
King as a separate company.l3
On November 7, which was the next
business day, Pillsbury's stock closed at $59.391
The final opinion of the Delaware Court of Chancery came down on
December 16.92 On this day, Pillsbury's stock closed at $62 1/4.

alcoholic beverages from owning or having an interest in a distributorship or
retail outlet." Id. at 1051.
381. Id. at 1051-52.
382. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343 (July,
Aug., Sept. 1988).
383. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1050.
384. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343 (Oct.,
Nov., Dec. 1988).
385. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1052.
386. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343 (Oct.,
Nov., Dec. 1988).
387. Pillsbury,558 A.2d at 1052.
388. Id.
389. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343 (Oct.,
Nov., Dec. 1988).
390. Pillsbury,558 A.2d at 1061.
391. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343 (Oct.,
Nov., Dec. 1988).
392. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1049.
393. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343 (Oct.,
Nov., Dec. 1988).
-
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Grand Metropolitan's tender offer for the stock of Pillsbury closed on

395
December 232" Pillsbury's stock closed at $65 3/4 on this day.

On December 30, Pillsbury's stock closed at $65 7/8.396 This was a
high for the stock during the period of the takeover.39
During the course of the takeover process Pillsbury's stock showed a
significant gain. 98 Pillsbury's stock closed as low as $33 5/8 per share on
July 19, and rose to a high of $65 7/8 on December 30.3" This is a gain
of 96%.'

394. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1060.
395. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343 (Oct.,
Nov., Dec. 1988).
396. Id.
397. Pillsbury's stock also closed at $65 7/8 on January 3 and January
10, 1989. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 347 (April,
May, June 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343
(July, Aug., Sept. 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange
343 (Oct., Nov., Dec. 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock
Exchange 338 (Jan., Feb., Mar. 1989).
398. See supra note 397.
399. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343 (July,
Aug., Sept. 1988); Daily Stock Price'Record New York Stock Exchange 343
(Oct., Nov., Dec. 1988). If the close of the tender offer on December 23 is
considered the end of the takeover period, the closing high for Pillsbury's
stock would be $65 3/4 per share. This price was attained on December 23.
I have used the closing price of $65 7/8 attained on December 30, because
this price resulted from the takeover process.
400. If one looks at the low for Pillsbury's stock in May of 1988, which
was when Pillsbury first became aware of Grand Metropolitan's interest in
Pillsbury, instead of the $33 5/8 low achieved during the course of the
takeover process, the percentage of change would be different. The closing
low for Pillsbury's stock in May 1988 was $35 1/4 per share. When
compared with the December 30 high of $65 7/8, this results in a gain of
87%.
The gain in value of Pillsbury's stock might also be calculated by
limiting the reference period to the date of the Delaware Court of Chancery's
opinion. The high for this period was $63 which occurred on December 14.
A comparison of the low price for Pillsbury's stock of $33 5/8, against the
high price on December 14 of $63, yields a gain in the price of Pillsbury's
stock of 87%. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 343
(Oct., Nov., Dec. 1988).
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Pillsbury's strategic plan was valued by its experts as achieving a present
minimum value of $68 per share. 1 Grand Metropolitan's tender offer price
for Pillsbury's shares was $63 per share. 2 The difference in price is $5 or
8% per share. Although this is a significant difference, it could be argued that
this disparity appears more modest when one considers that the tender offer
was a present cash offer and the board's plan was based on projected growth,
which if realized, would be received in the future. 3 It might be argued that
the holding of the court in Pillsbury could be supported by a position based
on an economic evaluation of the facts, concentrating on what could be argued
is a modest difference in value between the alternatives when one considers
all the relevant factors involved.
From an economic perspective, the Interco and Pillsburycases share four
characteristics. First, in both cases, the target's shares rose greatly in value
during the course of the takeover process. 4" This gave the shareholders the
opportunity to receive a considerable premium on their shares due to the
existence of a tender offer.
Second, it could be argued that the difference in value between the
respective offers in each case was modest when consideration is given to all
the relevant factors.4 5
Third, an argument could be made that the lower offer in each case was
a cash offer while the higher offers, which were based on projected growth,
were speculative.4

Regardless of which figures are used, the point is clear that Pillsbury's
stock rose sharply in price during the course of the takeover process.
401. Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co.
Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1988).
402. Id. at 1052.
403. The Delaware Court of Chancery in Pillsbury recognized the fact
that the value of the board's plan was based on projected growth, which, if
realized, was expected to materialize perhaps in 1992 or 1993. Id. at 1057.
404. Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange 229, 347
(April, May, June 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock Exchange
227, 343 (July, Aug., Sept. 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New York Stock
Exchange 226, 343 (Oct., Nov., Dec. 1988); Daily Stock Price Record New
York Stock Exchange 223, 338 (Jan., Feb, Mar. 1989).
, 405. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1057-58; City Capital Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798-99 (Del. Ch.), appealdismissed,
556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). This argument is more difficult to make in
Pillsburythan in Interco because of the greater difference in price.
406. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1052, 1057; Interco, 551 A.2d at 798800.
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Fourth, in each case, shareholders could realize the value in the lower
offers immediately, instead of waiting, as was required by each of the higher
offers. 407

The four characteristics identified above provide plausible arguments to
support the holdings of the Delaware Court of Chancery in Interco and
Pillsbury. Though these four points are worthy of consideration, they should
not overshadow the legal significance of these two holdings, nor the negative
implications that they embody. As outlined previously in this Article,'
these holdings make it difficult for boards of directors and those advising
boards to know where they stand with respect to mergers and tender offers.
These decisions weaken the protection afforded to directors under the business
judgment rule as it is interpreted in Unocal. This results in undercutting a
board of directors' position to defend a company against hostile raiders and
to maximize shareholder value. It is ironic that these decisions may have the
result of undermining just what the Delaware Court of Chancery was trying
to achieve in both cases, which was to help shareholders maximize the value
of their shares. Further, the Delaware Court of Chancery failed to recognize
the precedents set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court in prior decisions.
What is most distressing is that the Delaware Court of Chancery failed
to address the main issue in these cases and many other merger cases, which
is the problem of valuation. The Delaware Court of Chancery avoided this
issue. If it had properly addressed this issue, the Delaware Court of Chancery
probably could have held as it did in Interco and Pillsburywithout establishing dangerous and vague legal standards.
VII. CONCLUSION
While it could be argued that there is some economic justification for the
410 this
Delaware Court of Chancery's holdings in Interco °9 and Pillsbury,
is overshadowed by the inappropriate and misapplied legal reasoning used to
arrive at the final determinations in both cases. The Delaware Court of
Chancery paid little attention to and/or misapplied previous holdings of the
Delaware Supreme Court and set dangerous legal precedents to be considered
by those in both the legal and business communities.41

407. See Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1057; Interco, 551 A.2d at 799.
408. See supra parts III(A)-(E), IV(A)-(B).
409. City Capital Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787
(Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
410. Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury Co. (In re Pillsbury Co.
Shareholders Litigation), 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
411. The Delaware Court of Chancery paid little attention to and/or
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Fortunately, the situation today may not be as bad as it seemed just after
the Delaware Court of Chancery announced its decision in Pillsbury.412 The
Delaware Court of Chancery's opinions in both TW Services413 and
Paramount,414 as well as. the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in
Paramount,4 seem to greatly undercut and limit the impact of Interco and
Pillsbury with regard to poison pills and the related issues that a board must
address in a takeover setting. The Delaware Court of Chancery went to great
lengths to distinguish its decisions in TW Services and Paramountfrom its
holdings in Interco and Pillsbury.416 This was done to preserve as much of

the prior opinions as possible, but however viewed, the opinions in TW
Services and Paramountmark a change in course for the Delaware Court of
Chancery and a lessening in significance of the previous two decisions.
Possibly the aspect of TW Services and Paramount that is of greatest
importance is the Delaware Court of Chancery's recognition that a board of
directors in a takeover setting can choose to maximize the long-term value of
a company at the expense of short-term gains.417 This is sure to be an

misapplied the holdings of the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal, Revlon,
Moran, and other cases. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del.
1985); see also Schwartz, Chancery Court Ignores Del. Supreme Court
Precedents,supra note 3.
Interestingly, the Interco court could have better supported its holding
without setting the dangerous legal precedents that it did, by concentrating on
a valuation-based analysis and argument such as the one I discussed in Part
IV(C) of this Article.
412. The Delaware Court of Chancery decided Pillsburyon December 16,
1988. Pillsbury,558 A.2d at 1049.
413. TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, .10298,
1989 WL 20290 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
414. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd, 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
415. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
416. See Paramount,[1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1
94,514, at 93,282-83; TWServs., 1989 WL 20290, at *9-10.
417. See ThW Servs., 1989 WL 20290, at *6-7, 11; Paramount, [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,514, at 93,267, 93,272,
93,276-77, 93,283, 93,284; see also supra part V (discussing the potential
negative aspects of this position in the analysis of the Delaware Supreme
Court's Paramountdecision).
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argument raised by future boards that are faced with defending against a
hostile takeover attempt.
The major failure of the Delaware Court of Chancery in all of these
decisions is that the court failed to adequately address the valuation issue,
which was the central problem in all four cases and is a critical part of most
takeover settings. Until more clearly defined valuation guidelines are
established, ones that will lead to more realistic and consistent results, and
methodologies are formulated to put the responsibility for valuations on those
who conduct and advise on valuations, rather than on those that are advised,
the valuation-based litigation that we have seen in recent years will continue.
The root of the valuation problem must be addressed and not its end result.
In the final analysis, the poison pill has come through this series of
decisions by the Delaware Court of Chancery largely intact.418 It is still the
foremost weapon at the disposal of a board of directors
to defend a company
419
against an unwanted, hostile, takeover attempt.

418. It can be argued that the poison pill might have even benefitted from
this series of Delaware Court of Chancery decisions if one considers that it
can be contended that poison pills can be used to defend a company's longterm strategy, even if such a strategy may be at the expense of short-term
gains in share value.
419. See Compounding the Headache, supra note 3.
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